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War in the Caucasus is Inevitable

by

Avetik Avo Avetyan

Special Agent

US Department of State

WAR IN THE CAUCASUS IS INEVITABLE


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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

Behind the frozen status of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict lurks a massive disaster that could lead to a third world war. Yet who has ever heard of Nagorno-Karabakh? The south Caucasus is home to a delicate arrangement of dominos, lined up, one after another, with the potential of causing a chain reaction with slightest disturbance. The media has steered clear from this active conflict, but this paper will shed light to its potential destructive force by demonstrating the sources of tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and how Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the United States play into the mixture. Doused with ancient enmity and ethnic hatred, the collective memory of the Armenian genocide is at the heart of the current Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. For these reasons, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may be the catalyst for the next world war.

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INTRODUCTION

The first and most violent conflict after the fall of Soviet Union was between the Armenian and Azerbaijani forces over the Nagorno-Karabagh region. Although a ceasefire agreement has restored stability between the warring parties, significant military and political developments in the Caucasus threaten to invigorate another war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.¹ Focusing on Armenian identity and nationhood as key to understanding this conflict, the thesis of this paper is to prove that the resumption of violence in the Nagorno-Karabagh region is inevitable and may lead to a momentous crisis in the Caucasus involving the regional powers of Turkey and Russia, and perhaps even Iran and the United States.

It is important to highlight the reason why the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict is a matter of strategic concern for the United States. This conflict is among the lesser known, overlooked, but most explosive conflicts that can be effectively resolved in the event that the international community approaches it with the outmost care, urgency, and with the consideration that minor actions today will amplify in time. A large scale war has the potential of spiraling out of control quickly and with devastating consequences for the region. The incumbent superpower, the United States, has been unable to exert its influence adequately to address threats against its interests in the Caucasus region. As a result, the credibility of the United States in the Caucasus has subsided, especially with

¹ See Appendix A for an area map

American unwillingness to intervene on behalf of its Georgian ally during the 2008 Russian invasion. In 2009, the U.S. failed to help normalize the Armenian-Turkish relations, and has been unable to help Turkey become a European Union member. As a result Russia, Iran and Turkey have all contributed to undermine the influence of the United States in the region.

Even without the United States as an influential player, the efforts of these regional powers to deal with the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict have been mediocre at best. As this thesis will clearly indicate, the time for resolution of this long-standing frozen conflict is growing short. Inaction at this time will prove to be irreversibly imprudent. Conditions between Armenia and Azerbaijan are such that in the words of strategist Harry Yager, “Small actions can have large strategic effects. If the timing is wrong, results invariably take larger efforts and cost more in terms of tangible and intangible resources.”² Whichever power is able to defuse this dangerous situation and establish a just solution to age-old rivalries and fears will gain an immense strategic advantage in the central Caucasus. However, if war comes, it has the potential to draw in powers, forcing them to take sides, and leading to a more dangerous and much broader war, with serious consequences for peace and security in the region.

The historic roots of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict date back to the rivalry between the Ottoman, Russian, and Persian empires. The complex mixture of vibrant abundant cultures, religious traditions, and national identities in the region were controlled throughout the eighteenth to early twentieth centuries through a strong,

² Harry R Yager, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The little book on Big Strategy*, US Strategic Studies War College, accessed December 13, 2010 <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=641> (USG February 2006) 13.

centrally controlled military and political power. The Soviet Union inherited this role and suppressed nationalism by channeling these headstrong efforts towards building a multi-ethnic socialist society. The initial phases of Sovietization placed the territory of Nagorno-Karabagh with its dominant Armenian population under Azeri rule as part of a divide and conquer strategy. It remained a major point of contention between the Armenian and Azeri Soviet Republics throughout the existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

The current political environment of the Caucasus is as contentious and full of turbulence over ethnic, territorial, historical, political, and natural resource disputes as it did in the early stages of Soviet reconsolidation. As early as 1916, Azerbaijani forces joined with Turkish forces to fight Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabagh.

The fall of Soviet Union allowed the Nagorno-Karabagh issue to be resolved by violence. International organizations and regional powers were unprepared to deal with the renewed conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, which by 1991 had escalated to a full fledged war. Ethnic kinship prompted Turkey to join Azerbaijan in establishing an effective and devastating economic blockade on Armenia. In 1992, the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) created the Minsk group (headed by a co-chairmanship consisting of United States, Russia, and France) with the sole purpose of arbitrating the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabagh region.

In 1994, the Russian government brokered a cease fire agreement that suspended the conflict, leaving seven districts along with the entire Nagorno-Karabagh region under the control of the Armenian and Nagorno-Karabagh forces. This pause in fighting gave

the international organizations and regional powers hope that the conflict could be resolved diplomatically. Despite arranging many high level diplomatic meetings between the political leadership of Armenia and Azerbaijan, up to today, the Minsk group has been largely ineffective at resolving the conflict.

Growing increasingly frustrated with the failed diplomatic process, the political leadership of both Azerbaijan and Armenia threaten to resolve the Nagorno-Karabagh dispute through military force. Even though the conflicting parties have managed the ceasefire on the contact line without the presence of international monitors or peace keeping troops, and the situation on the border has been relatively calm, sporadic skirmishes violating the ceasefire continue to claim small numbers of casualties every month.³

By 2010, the government of Azerbaijan increased its military budget, surpassing the entire state budget of Armenia. Fearing Azerbaijan's military capability, Armenia signed a military defense agreement with Russia and inclined to develop an economic relationship with the Iran. In turn, the Azerbaijani government ratified a similar agreement, solidifying Turkey's military and economic commitment to Azerbaijan. Simultaneously the Azeri government secured military and economic aid from United States. Thus, in 2011, the stage appears to be set for conflict, as Russia, the United States, Iran, and Turkey have added a new layer of complexity to the already turbulent Nagorno-Karabagh issue.

³ Emil Danielyan, *Azerbaijan Reports Casualties As Karabagh Skirmishes Continue*, in Armtown.com, <http://www.armtown.com/news/en/rfe/20110324/2349095/> (accessed April 28, 2011).

The fact that both United States and Turkey are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and are supporting Azerbaijan against Russia and Iran as sponsors of Armenia, raises the stakes of a potential conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh even higher. In addition, the oil rich Caspian Sea basin has given Azerbaijan the economic leverage to manipulate regional players, adding another layer of complexity. Instead of focusing on resolving the conflict, the powers have used the frozen status of the conflict to advance their own national interests to gain the strategic foothold in the region, which means access to oil.

According to high ranking U.S. Department of State official, the situation on the front line between Nagorno-Karabagh and Azerbaijani forces is very tense and “the results of miscalculation where the strategic corporal who makes a mistake, thus forcing commanders into a war may initiate an all -out war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which may not even include Nagorno-Karabagh, since the terrain there does not favor Azerbaijan.”⁴

Maintaining the status quo of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict thus far has elevated the tensions to a boiling point. The competing national interests of Russia, United States, Iran, and Turkey competing for greater influence over the belligerents and access to Azeri oil, the absence of peace-keepers and monitors on the frontline, the increased rate of ceasefire violations with aggressive military spending by the belligerents are clear indications that when the conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh resumes, a large scale war in

⁴ Anonymous State Department official, electronic mail communication with author, (November 23, 2010).

the Caucasus involving the regional players is very possible. The prospect of war lies in the degree of involvement by powers.

International mediators have avoided the historical roots of this conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and instead have focused their efforts solely on the Nagorno-Karabagh border issues. To truly understand the current conflict in order to mediate a working solution, it is vital to recognize the emblematic significance of Nagorno-Karabagh to both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The current conflict is deeply seated combination of historic issues stemming from injustice, religious and political oppression, ethnic cleansing, and national survival.

The underlying issues of the conflict have been widely portrayed by mediators as one of self-determination by Armenians versus the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Though this argument is superficially correct, the premise is completely shortsighted because it overlooks many of the fine historical details which inhibit resolution. In order to identify the issues that are embedded in history and tightly woven into the modern day conflict, we must first understand the historical foundations of Armenian nationhood and Armenian national identity tied to collective memory.

CHAPTER 1: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Ethnic lineage, religion and language

Armenia is a landlocked country in the South Caucasus bordering Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. The Southern Caucasus Mountains begin in Georgia and pass through Armenia and Nagorno-Karabagh into Azerbaijan. Armenia in ancient times contained territory stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, but was occupied by a series of invaders and incorporated into empires throughout the centuries.¹

The interplay of religion, language, and ethnic kinship would shape the fate of Armenians in the region, because they retained a distinct identity through religion and language. Armenia had adopted Christianity as a state religion in fourth century C.E. and created a unique alphabet in the fifth century.² Since language significantly impacts the culture it expresses³ and religion shapes identity patterns and bonds humans into groups, then through religion and language Armenians retained a distinct identity.⁴ Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Armenian territory was divided between the Ottoman and Persian empires.⁵

¹ See Appendix B for historical map of Armenia

² See Appendix C for the Armenian Alphabet

³ Harold R. Isaacs, *Idols Of The Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change* (London: Harvard University Press, 1975), 96.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 147.

⁵ Hooman Peimani, *Conflict And Security In Central Asia And The Caucasus* (California: ABC-CLIO, LLC 2009), 230.

Armenians had much more autonomy in the Persian Khanates, semi-autonomous regions ruled by military rulers called Khans under the control of Persia.⁶ The Khanates contained many different ethnic and religious groups, forcing the Persians to display a greater level of tolerance. Armenians used their historic memories, myths, facts, religious saints, heroes and traditions to link their past with the future. Harold Isaacs notes that:

These linkages help make tolerable the individual existence that is otherwise intolerably bounded by its own fragile aloneness, its own birth, and its own death. The element of the shared past, of his own history and origins is deeply imbedded in every individual personal identity; it is part of the basic group identity with which each personal identity is inseparably molded.⁷

Nonetheless, the unique ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences largely isolated the Armenians from other groups. The Persians controlled most of what is modern Armenia, including the present-day capital city, Yerevan.⁸ At the beginning of the 19th century, the Persian and Ottoman control of the Caucasus was challenged by the Russian Empire as it began expanding southward with strategic ambitions to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.⁹ Largely alienated by the Persians, Armenians viewed the Russians both as natural allies and as co-religionists.¹⁰ The Russians, for the same reasons, increasingly favored the Armenians over the predominantly Muslim populations in the Caucasian Khanates. “Russia consistently tried to alter the demographic conditions in the South Caucasus, by inciting Muslim Azeris to leave, and welcoming Christian

⁶ Svante E. Cornell, *small nations and great powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus* (England: Curzon Press, 2001), 30. See Appendix D for map of Persian Khanates.

⁷ Harold R. Isaacs, *Idols Of The Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change* (London: Harvard University Press, 1975), 117-118.

⁸ Cornell, 36.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Armenians in great numbers.”¹¹ Such incitements led to regional instability and to the first Russo-Persian War of 1813, which ended with the Treaty of Gulistan. The Russians gained full control over Georgia, Dagestan, Karabakh and most of present-day Azerbaijan from Persia.¹²

In 1826 Persia launched an attack to recapture its lost territories from the Russian Empire, leading to the second Russo-Turkish War, which ended with a Persian defeat and the signing of the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828.¹³ Russia emerged in full control of Nakhichevan, the Yerevan Khanate (the present day capital of Armenia) and part of Azerbaijan; the Russo-Persian border was set at the Aras River.¹⁴ Although Armenians enjoyed a level of economic prosperity under Russian control, the Armenian church and the Armenian language were under threat. The Russians closed many churches and restricted the use of the Armenian language as part of a process of subsuming Armenian identity into a Russian identity.¹⁵

In the early part of 19th century, increased literacy and large number of newspapers throughout Europe allowed a faster exchange of ideas among the educated elite of Armenia. In spring of 1848 a series of uprisings and revolutions took place in Europe, shaking the authoritarian regimes and asserting the desire of the people to gain political freedom.¹⁶ The Ottoman Empire was also experiencing similar social changes

¹¹ Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd edition (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 193.

¹² Cornell, 35.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid., 37.

¹⁵ Peimani, 237.

¹⁶ Mike Rapport, *1848 Year of Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 10.

called *Tanzimat* (reorganization), which was organized by European-educated Ottoman Sultans.¹⁷ The aim of the *Tanzimat* was to modernize Ottoman Turkey to protect and maintain central control of the empire against external forces and unify the ethnic minorities by promising equal treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims alike.¹⁸ The concept of “Ottomanism” was introduced by the Ottoman government to create a sense of imperial identity and belonging to counter ethno-national developments within an already weak empire.¹⁹ One of those reforms granted the Armenians permission to have a special constitution to self-govern the Armenian populated regions.²⁰

These impositions became a point of contention between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations. Muslims considered the reforms as European ideals being forced on the Muslim communities and preferred an Islamic government.²¹ By 1870’s, the pressure and influence of the Muslim communities reversed the Ottoman policies which became intolerant of ethno-national movements. Armenians increased their pressure on the Ottoman government by demanding equal and fair treatment that had been previously guaranteed. But Ottoman officials were hesitant largely due to internal and external threats on the Ottoman Empire.

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 validated the Ottoman officials’ fears of external threats. The war ended with the Treaty of Berlin, which awarded the European

¹⁷ Glenn E. Curtis, *Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia country studies*, Library of Congress, Federal Research Division (March 1994), area handbook services, First Printing (Washington 1995), 13.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁹ Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan, *Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview 1880 to 1945*, Library of Congress Volume 2 (Santa Barbara 2008), 763.

²⁰ Curtis, 13.

²¹ Herb and Kaplan, 763.

powers some of the Black Sea coastal cities to Russia and recognized the independence of Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia.²² As Ottoman officials watched their European empire quickly disintegrate Armenian intellectuals voiced their concerns over mistreatment by the Muslim Ottomans and asked for European intervention. Russia and Britain agreed to support Armenian claims, but progress was very slow.²³

By 1890 Armenians had established two revolutionary movements, the Hnchak (Bell) party in Geneva and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) party, which also had a military organization known as *Dashnaktsutyun* (patriotism) or *Dashnak*, in Georgia.²⁴ The *Dashnak* movement, largely made up of young, radical socialists, favored Armenian autonomy within the Russian and Ottoman empires,²⁵ and maintained the idea that language, religion, and ethnicity were an integral part of national identity and must be protected at all costs.²⁶

After 1890, when the *Dashnaks* began armed pockets of resistance to bring about change within Turkey,²⁷ the Sultan Abdul Hamid II declared the Armenians an internal fifth column which could mobilize against the Ottoman Empire.²⁸ Between 1894-1896,

²² Curtis, 13.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Thomas De Waal, *The Caucasus* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 51.

²⁵ Curtis, 14.

²⁶ Stuard D Stein, *A Lecture on the Armenian Genocide*, Senior Lecture in Sociology and Comparative Genocide and the Holocaust, University of West of England, Bristol http://www.anca.org/assets/pdf/armenian_genocide_reference/A%20Lecture%20on%20The%20Armenian%20Genocide.pdf (accessed on June 7, 2011). In his lecture on the Armenian genocide, Professor Stuart D. Stein argued that these elements of the communal identity are non-negotiable and so long as they retain political salience, they cannot be traded or bargained with. [need citation]

²⁷ Curtis, 14.

²⁸ Ibid.

the Sultan fomented inter-communal hatred and ordered large-scale killings, resulting in the massacre of 300,000 Armenians.²⁹

In 1898, the Young Turks, Ottoman officers who promised to bring about reforms gained Armenian support.³⁰ However, the Young Turks, much like the Sultan, considered the Armenians an internal threat and had a racist national agenda to rid the empire from minorities and unite the Turkic people of Central Asia.³¹ As the first Russian revolution took its course between 1905 and 1907, Russia's military control over the Caucasus weakened. *Dashnaks* and the newly formed Azeri Nationalist party called *Musavat* began fierce fighting over territories they occupied.³² Called the "Armeno-Tatar War" most of the fighting took place in and around Baku and Nagorno-Karabagh.

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The events . . . are then of crucial importance to the further development of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, primarily because this period saw the first instances of organized armed confrontation between the two communities. The symbolically so important 'first blood' of the conflict was spilled during this period. Moreover, the events were instrumental in, and certainly hastened the development of a self aware Azerbaijani nation.³⁴

The fighting ended after the Russian military reasserted its control and imposed stability in the region. In 1908, the Young Turks, with the support of its Armenian population, successfully carried out a coup dethroning the Sultan.³⁵ However, the promises of change and reform were never implemented. Instead, the Young Turks

²⁹ Curtis, 14.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Donald Miller; Lorna Touryan Miller, *Armenia: Portraits of Survival and Hope* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 7.

³² De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 51.

³³ Ibid., 52. Note that Azerbaijanis were for many years identified as Tatars.

³⁴ Cornell, 70.

³⁵ Curtis, 14.

immediately began to promote their nationalistic ideals to develop a Pan-Turkish state and eliminate internal threats.

The Young Turks considered Armenians as a threat to their regime. In 1914, at the beginning of the First World War the Young Turks began a systemic ethnic cleansing of the Armenian populations from the Ottoman Empire which led to the well-known genocide of 1915, claiming the lives of an estimated 1.5 million Armenians.³⁶ Since “the past remains very much alive whether as fantasy, fiction, or fact, . . . whether it is recorded in holy writ or as history,”³⁷ the genocide remained alive as a crucial part of the Armenian collective identity and memory.

It was relatively easy for the Young Turks to win the support of the Azeris to help deal with the Armenians. The Azerbaijani religious kinship, ethno-linguistic ties with the Turks, and geographic proximity made this a natural alliance. After killing or driving out the Armenian population, the Turks and the Azeris took possession of territory that had been considered as ancient homeland for centuries by both Azeri tribes and ethnic Armenians. The Armenians that survived the genocide were concentrated in Eastern Armenia.

The Bolshevik revolution in 1917, followed by a civil war, created opportunities for ethnic nationalism to be expressed through independence movements in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia all declared independence.³⁸ The newly-established Azerbaijani forces soon laid exclusive claim to Armenian territory and occupied

³⁶ See Appendix E for map of areas cleansed of Armenians during the “Genocide”

³⁷ Isaacs, 120-121.

³⁸ W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields; A history of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828-1921* (Great Britain; University Press Cambridge 1953), 499.

Nagorno-Karabagh. Meanwhile, Turkish military forces advanced into unguarded Armenian areas, systemically killing or driving out the people. The Armenians found themselves in a war of annihilation.³⁹ Overwhelmed by Turkish forces, Armenians withdrew from Kars and Van into eastern Armenia. In 1918, Armenian defenders resisted the Turkish advance that culminated in the battle of Sardarapat, halting the enemy a mere 40 kilometers west of Yerevan.⁴⁰

By 1920, the existence of Armenia as an independent state became a distant dream as Bolshevik forces occupied Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan and placed Soviet governments in power. Fighting in the region between *Dashnaks* and the Red Army continued, but by the end of 1920 the resistance was crushed with brutal force. The question of unifying the people of the Southern Caucasus became a challenge for the newly formed Soviet Union, since ethnic hostilities were still fresh in the memories of the local populations.

Historically, the Russian Empire's approach to dealing with the multi-ethnic and nationalist movements was through assimilation and Russification.⁴¹ Vladimir Lenin, now holding on to power by terror and force, had promised that communism would discard the "Great Russian chauvinism" and develop new national and multicultural traditions under the banner of the Soviet Union.⁴² On March 16, 1921, in the friendship

³⁹ Allen and Muratoff, 469.

⁴⁰ De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 62.

⁴¹ Edward Allworth, Alexandre Bennigsen, Zbigniew Brzezinski, John N. Hazard, Hans Kohn, Vaclav Lamser, Robert A Lewis, Marc Raeff and Paula G Rubel, *Soviet Nationality Problems*, ed. Edward Allworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 40.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 49. Main Revolutionary organizer behind the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917.

treaty with the Turkish Grand national Assembly in Ankara, Soviet Russia finalized the return of the Armenian provinces of Kars and Ardahan.⁴³

The Commissar of Nationalities, Joseph Stalin, who himself was a native Georgian, disagreed with Lenin and wanted more central control over the ethnic nationalities of the southern Caucasus. Stalin believed that the inter-ethnic violence and the fragile economic condition of the Caucasus needed a strong federation that could help the region move into the modern era.⁴⁴ Stalin, who later became Lenin's successor, believed that "Soviet supranationalism and the reawakened vigor of Russian nationalism as the decisive support of Soviet communism in times of unprecedented danger."⁴⁵

Lenin, in his speech to the eight Russian Communist Party Congress, on March 19, 1919, declared that "there are still many communists who demand 'uniform schools' and accordingly no instruction to be given except in Russian. In my view a communist who thinks in that way is a pan-Russian chauvinist."⁴⁶ The communism and socialism that Lenin had envisioned would have had a different impact on nation building within the Soviet Union. But by 1924, Lenin died, unable to change the direction of Stalin's efforts.

By emphasizing patriotism in the Soviet Union, Stalin began building an authoritarian state by systematically ordering secret police units to kill intellectuals and individuals that contradicted or questioned his strategy of *Korenizatsia*, programs to help

⁴³ Allworth et al., 50.

⁴⁴ De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 73.

⁴⁵ Allworth et al., 57.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 49.

modernize the disparate nationalities.⁴⁷ In 1921, Stalin began an “administrative construction” mapping and separating the ethnic and national land of the Southern Caucasus into autonomous regions to thwart future quarrels and help bring about economic stability to the area.⁴⁸ Because ethnic lineage, language, and religion had served as the building blocks of nationalism, the Soviet map of the Caucasus created inter-ethnic and multilingual communities that would be eventually Sovietized under strong central control. Nagorno-Karabagh became one of these enclaves, an inter-border region between the historic territories of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenia, the most homogeneous of the three republics, did not have any autonomous territories. In Azerbaijan, the borders of the new Nagorny Karabagh Autonomous Region were drawn to give it a 94 percent Armenian majority. The exclave of Nakhichevan, which did not share a border with the rest of Azerbaijan but had a clear Azerbaijani majority, was made into an autonomous republic.⁴⁹

Stalin had thus managed to divide the Caucasian nations by purposely creating an Armenian enclave, Nagorno-Karabagh, surrounded by Azerbaijan and an Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan completely divided from Azerbaijan by Armenia.⁵⁰ Now as part of the Soviet Union, the Armenian Soviet Republic was locked in an uncomfortable embrace with the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic through the Nagorno-Karabagh region.

As the Russian, Persian, and Ottoman empires had waged war to advance territorial gains in the south Caucasus region throughout the nineteenth century, the Armenian people had stubbornly protected their religious and ethnic identity. The Azeri and Turkish quest to clear the remaining Armenian populations from eastern Armenia

⁴⁷ De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 71, 80. Korenizatsia, Russian word for rooting or nativization.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Cornell, 43.

from 1915 – 1920 was a critical turning point for Armenian national identity, now resurrected in the wake of the destruction of the Russian and Ottoman empires. Armenians subconsciously linked Azeris to the genocide of 1915 and the collective memory of the Armenians highlights that Turks and Azerbaijanis will always remain a threat to their very existence as a people.

The placement of the predominantly Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabagh within the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic only served to build Armenian nationalism and stoke fears that at any time, the Armenian minority could be exterminated by the Azeri government. This collective understanding fueled an overwhelming attraction toward unification, further strengthening Armenian national awareness and a desire for security.

CHAPTER 2: COMMUNISM: A VEHICLE FOR NATIONALISM

From 1926 until Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet establishment industrialized and modernized the republics, while maintaining full control of its population through police terror and brutal oppression.¹ In order to eliminate any competition to the Soviet regime, religious practices in the newly-formed Soviet republics were prohibited. Atheism was not only actively promoted but religious organizations were also suppressed and pushed underground. Churches were allowed to exist for ceremonial and symbolic purposes but it was common to see churches converted into barnyards or used for strategic agricultural storehouses. Those who opposed communism were ousted and sent to the Gulags - Soviet labor camps.

The Soviets succeeded in stabilizing the region by eliminating direct Turkish and Iranian influence in the Caucasus. In creating the Soviet republics, Moscow purposely intermixed ethnic and national boundaries to create internal divisions, making them therefore less capable of forming national or ethnic based resistance. The protection of the Soviet rule, ironically allowed Armenians to maintain their cultural and national identity, enjoying a greater latitude to pursue and maintain their religious, ethnic, and cultural traditions.

The reason for this is that Armenian communists were successful in conveying to Soviet authorities that religious and national ideals would be useful in controlling the Armenian population. Between 1939 and 1948, the Soviet authorities under Stalin's

¹ Curtis, 42.

direction paid the travel expenses of the Armenian diaspora willing to return to Soviet Armenia. According to one estimate, “100,000 Armenians from Syria, Lebanon, Iran, France, Greece, Egypt, the United States, and other countries immigrated to the Armenian Soviet Republic.”²

The arrival of newcomers called *Hayrenadarts*, (literally meaning “fatherhood returnees”-- satirically called *Aghbars* or “brothers”) brought with them a wealth of knowledge about traditional crafts and cultural history.³ Over time they contributed to a renewed national and religious awareness. Many who witnessed the Armenian massacres first hand contributed their stories to the Armenian collective memory and identity. During World War II, Stalin used the Armenian church to maintain morale during the German occupation, even as Soviet authorities controlled Armenian religious institutions by co-opting priests, who were trained as informants on church activities.

After the war, Armenia continued to progress in literacy. The death of Stalin in 1953 led to important political changes. According to one historian, Moscow granted the republic more autonomy in decision making, which meant that the local communist elite increased its power and became entrenched in Armenian politics in the 1950’s and 1960’s.”⁴ By succumbing to Armenian national demands the Soviet authorities unwillingly legitimized and endorsed the pursuit of national ideals. Hence, Moscow’s political control over Armenia gradually began to diminish. The same leniency was

² Hrair R. Dekmejian, "The Armenian Diaspora" in *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II: Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century*, ed. Richard G Hovannisian (New York: St. Martin's Press 2004), 416.

³ In Eastern Armenian the word brother Yekhbayr is pronounced differently in the Western Armenian thus giving them the newcomers the nickname *Aghbars*.

⁴ Curtis, 18.

extended likewise towards the Armenian language. Nevertheless, Russian remained essential for advancement and upward mobility.

The Soviet government's toleration of limited expressions of Armenian national identity was all to be included within the larger goal of creating the Soviet utopia and the New Soviet Man – an individual whose loyalties were to the achievement of communism, rather than a particular nationality. When the level of religious, ethnic and linguistic freedom in Armenia spread to the Armenian communities in Azerbaijan, however, tensions began to rise in Nagorno-Karabagh. Census records of 1939, which indicated that 91 percent of the population in Nagorno-Karabagh was Armenian, the 1979 census showed a decline of the Armenian population to 79 %.⁵ At the same time census records clearly indicated a rise of the Azerbaijani population in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Beginning in the 1960s, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabagh complained of “political and cultural mistreatment” at the hands of the growing Azerbaijani majority. There were complaints of “inequitable distribution of economic resources, demographic manipulations and infringement the severance of cultural ties with Armenia, and perceptions of threats to the physical security of Armenians deepened the cleavages . . . creating stratified ethnic groups.”⁶ Soviet government's tolerance of Armenian nationalism became more evident when sporadic protests by the Armenians in Yerevan gave way to the construction of a monument to commemorate the victims of the Armenian genocide in 1967.⁷ This was a key indication of a growing Armenian

⁵ Cornell, 78.

⁶ Levon Chorbajian, *The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh From Secession to Republic* (New York: Palgrave Publishers 2001), 66.

⁷ Cornell, 78.

nationalism. Monuments are essential to identity and memory, because they help connect the present with the past. “A principal function of the past is to legitimize the present,” and as a means “of sanctioning power and authority.”⁸

The Armenians in Nagorno-Karabagh increased their ambitions for a unified Armenia. The 1979 census increased fears within the Armenian population that Azeris were manipulating the demographics as “had been done in Nakhichivan, where Armenians had represented 15 percent in the 1920’s, reduced now to only 1.4 percent.”⁹ Armenian government officials expressed their concerns about the demographic changes that were taking place in Nagorno-Karabagh during official Union meetings.¹⁰

By the late 1980s the stage was set for confrontation that would shake the Soviet system to near collapse. The atmosphere throughout the Soviet Union by 1987 had changed dramatically due to Communist Party, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s *Glasnost* (openness) and *Perestroika* (restructuring) policies, which were designed to allow a level of reform and encourage the Soviet people to voice their opinion and openly debate the country’s management. Unlike others in the USSR who used Glasnost to raise concerns about corruption, mishandling of the economy, and the environment, the Armenians used it to address Nagorno-Karabagh.

In October 1987, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabagh rejected the nomination of an ethnic Azeri to run the economic affairs of an Armenian village of Chardakli in Azerbaijan, which led to increased harassment and attacks on Armenians by the local

⁸ Isaacs, 118.

⁹ Cornell, 78.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Azeri villagers and police units.¹¹ News of the incident reached Yerevan and in few days Armenian politicians submitted a letter to Moscow requesting the transfer of Nagorno-Karabagh to the direct administration of the Armenian Soviet Republic. Along with the letter was a petition supporting the transfer, signed by Armenian residents from Nagorno-Karabagh, even though similar petitions and requests in the past had been ignored by Soviet authorities. The stories of the Chardakli events incited enough hostilities in Armenia that by January 1988 tens of thousands of Azeris were forced out of Armenia into the Azerbaijani cities of Baku and Sumgait.

On February 18, 1988 Moscow rejected the petition, which prompted the Nagorno-Karabagh Regional Council's vote on February 20 to request the transfer of the region to Armenia.¹² The Regional Council was the Soviet political party of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast responsible to carry out the political orders of Moscow.¹³ Kamran Bagirov, the Azeri leader in charge of the Regional Council was unable to stop the resolution from passing.¹⁴ It appeared that Soviet control, and more importantly, Azeri control of the Regional Council of Nagorno-Karabagh, was diminishing and an irredentist movement was in progress.

By February 25, ecological demonstrations in Armenia changed to political demonstrations demanding the unification of Nagorno-Karabagh with Armenia. This

¹¹ Cornell, 78-79. In 1963, a petition signed by Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and submitted to Moscow requesting to place Nagorno-Karabagh under Armenia's control was ignored by Soviet politicians although unrest in N.K. left eighteen casualties.

¹² Chorbajian, 69.

¹³ Cornell, 80.

¹⁴ Ibid.

prompted Gorbachev to meet with several leaders of the Karabagh Committee¹⁵ securing a one month moratorium on demonstrations.¹⁶ The General Secretary of the Soviet Union negotiating with Armenian nationalist leaders was interpreted by Armenians as a moral victory. Rumors that Nagorno-Karabagh would be transferred under Armenia's control spread throughout both Armenia and Azerbaijan which further escalated tensions between the two populations.¹⁷

On February 26, 1988 violent clashes in the capital city of Nagorno-Karabagh coupled with rumors of an Armenian irredentist movement within Nagorno-Karabagh led to Azeri nationalist demonstrations and protests in the Azeri city of Sumgait, demanding revenge against Armenians and full control of Nagorno-Karabagh. From February 27 to 29, mobs of Azeri protestors in Sumgait went on a rampage, looting Armenian homes and indiscriminately killing Armenians while Azeri law enforcement authorities and Soviet military personnel took no measures to stop the mobs.¹⁸ Stories of violence in Azeri families against their family members with Armenian ethnic ties reinforced fears in Armenian communities that history was indeed repeating itself.

Armenians correlated the brutal events in Sumgait to the Turkish atrocities of 1915, creating an impulsive catalyst that resurfaced ethnic hatred toward Azerbaijanis. Mass protests in Armenia quickly changed into republic-wide demonstrations. In retaliation of the killings in Sumgait, thousands of Azeris were forced to flee Armenia to make room for the Armenian refugees arriving from Azerbaijan. The violent events also

¹⁵ Karabagh Committee founded by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, first president of Armenia after dissolution of the Soviet Union, as a vehicle for Armenian national expression.

¹⁶ Cornell, 81.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 82.

appeared to reaffirm within the Armenian population that living in harmony with the Azeris would be impossible.

Both nationalities began to view Nagorno-Karabagh as essential to their history and part of non-negotiable identity. Ethnic and cultural boundaries proved to be more important than the artificial and arbitrary Soviet boundaries. For Azerbaijan, the loss of the Nagorno-Karabagh region could possibly encourage other minorities within Azerbaijan to begin secessionist movements, leading to the complete disintegration of their country. For the Armenians, winning the battle over Nagorno-Karabagh represents a small territorial victory, but most importantly, it is considered a major moral victory over the historical injustices it endured under the Ottoman and Soviet empires.

The cultural and symbolic meaning of Nagorny Karabakh for both peoples cannot be overstated. For Armenians, Karabakh is the last outpost of their Christian civilization and a historic haven of Armenian princes and bishops before the eastern Turkic world begins. Azerbaijanis talk of it as a cradle, nursery, or conservatoire, the birthplace of their musicians and poets. Historically, Armenia is diminished without this enclave and its monasteries and its mountain lords; geographically and economically, Azerbaijan is not fully viable without Nagorny Karabakh.¹⁹

Armenian nationalists now saw Nagorno-Karabagh as essential to Armenian national identity and destiny. Calls to unite Nagorno-Karabagh with Armenia and chants such as “fight to the end!” became a battle cry for Armenian nationalists to convince Soviet authorities to place Nagorno-Karabagh under Armenia’s control.

On March 23, 1988, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the most powerful Soviet legislative body officially rejected the unification of Nagorno-Karabagh with

¹⁹ De Waal, *Black Garden*, 3.

Armenia.²⁰ The Soviet decision further alienated and angered the Armenian population. Mass strikes both in Yerevan and in Nagorno-Karabagh continued to escalate tensions. Some Soviet leaders argued that reuniting Nagorno-Karabagh with Armenia was possible. In May of 1988, in an effort to regain control, Moscow replaced the Soviet leaders of both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In June of 1988, Soviet Political Bureau member, Yegor Ligachev, suggested to upgrade the Nagorno-Karabagh Autonomous Oblast to Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. Once violence ensued, however, the ethnic enmities created an uncompromising situation.²¹ The window of opportunity for the Soviet authorities to change the momentum of the Armenian irredentist movement was lost due to a slow military response to stop the violence in Sumgait in February and the Soviet decision rejecting Armenia's demand for reunification in March.²²

By early 1989, a series of back and forth declarations were made by the Azeri and Armenian Supreme Soviets claiming full authority over Nagorno-Karabagh, despite the fact that the Soviet authorities in Moscow had rejected these claims as unconstitutional. The Armenian Supreme Soviet went as far as to grant itself the power to veto any legislative orders from Moscow and declared the Armenian Supreme Soviet as the ultimate governing body of Armenia.²³ Mikhail Gorbachev's declaration of placing Nagorno-Karabagh under Moscow's authority failed to satisfy the belligerents.²⁴ The

²⁰ *The Europa World Year Book*, 116.

²¹ Cornell, 79.

²² *The Europa World Year Book*, 455.

²³ *Ibid.*, 456.

²⁴ Curtis, 20.

Karabagh Committee joined other nationalist organizations forming the Pan-Armenian National Movement (PNM) declaring its determination to fight for the re-unification of Nagorno-Karabagh with Armenia.

Similar developments were taking place in Azerbaijan. Under the leadership of a prominent historian, Abulfaz Elchibey an Azeri national movement in Azerbaijan called Azeri Popular Front (APF) organized demonstrations against the Azeri government for their failure to put down the Armenian revolt and end the secessionist movement in Nagorno-Karabagh.²⁵ Fighting ensued in Nagorno-Karabagh as groups of armed men from Armenia augmented Nagorno-Karabagh fighters with supplies and ammunition. The Azeri government enacted a full blockade, crippling the Armenian economy. On January 1990, APF organized rallies turned into another wave of pogroms as Azeris refugees in Baku carried out killings similar to the events in Sumgait. Once again, Soviet troops responded after the fact and brutally oppressed the Azeri demonstrations resulting in what some claim were thousands of Azeri casualties.²⁶

The failure of the Soviet military forces to stop the killings of Armenians in Baku, coupled with the continued blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Gorbachev's decision to leave Nagorno-Karabagh under Azeri control, convinced the Armenian leadership that Moscow was behind the Azeri cause.²⁷ In July, 1990 during the elections of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, the leader of the PNM, Levon Ter-Petrosyan won the chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet, adopted a declaration of sovereignty, and renamed

²⁵ Abulfaz Elchibey, real name Abulfaz Qadirqulu oğlu Aliyev, was the first democratic elected non-communist President of Azerbaijan, serving from June 16, 1992 until his overthrow in a coup d'état in June 1993. Cornell, 87.

²⁶ Cornell, 89.

²⁷ Curtis, 22.

the Armenian Soviet Republic to Republic of Armenia.²⁸ With a nationalist leadership firmly in control of the government in Armenia, Soviet control over the republics diminished as demonstrations and unrest spread throughout the rest of Soviet Union. Frustrated with the Armenian nationalism, Gorbachev in 1991 attempted to re-negotiate new terms for the union republics. Armenia refused to participate in the negotiations citing its determination for secession from the Soviet Union.

In August 1991, a group of top communist leaders attempted a failed coup against Gorbachev in Moscow, a last ditch effort to preserve the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. This was the event that convinced the Armenian leadership that Soviet Union was on a verge of collapse, because “the vast majority of citizens had lost faith in it, and because those commanding the armed forces were not prepared to order a bloody crackdown and an at least temporary return to Stalinist repression.”²⁹

Encouraged by the deteriorating political chaos in the Kremlin, Levon Ter-Petrosyan increased military and economic aid for Nagorno-Karabagh, even as he officially claimed that the Nagorno-Karabagh Armenians were in control of their own destiny. On September 21, 1991 Armenia officially declared its independence from the Soviet Union. Armenian nationalists in Nagorno-Karabagh declared independence from Azerbaijan by renaming the Nagorno-Karabagh Autonomous Oblast to the Republic of Nagorno-Karabagh.³⁰

²⁸ *The Europa World Year Book*, 456.

²⁹ Daniel Treisman, *The Return: Russia's Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev* (New York: Free Press, 2011), 29.

³⁰ This act fully complied with existing law. Indeed, under the 1990 Soviet law “On the Procedures for a Union Republic to Leave the USSR,” the secession of a Soviet republic from the body of the USSR allowed an autonomous district in the same republic’s territory to also trigger its own process of independence. Thus, Nagorno Karabakh has never been part of the independent – (see pg. 152)

On October 18, 1991 Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union and hardened its stance on the Nagorno-Karabagh secessionist movement, declaring an unwavering commitment to its territorial integrity and annulled Nagorno-Karabagh's autonomy.³¹ On December 10, the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian population held its own referendum on independence, overwhelmingly approving Nagorno-Karabakh's sovereignty from Azerbaijan.³²

By January 1992, Azerbaijani forces were on a full-scale attack, bombing Stepanakert, the capital city of Nagorno-Karabagh, from the Azeri city of Shusha.³³ Armenian fighters counterattacked, and by May of 1992, succeeded in capturing Shusha.³⁴ With complete control of the region, the Armenian fighters focused on the Azeri-controlled Lachin Valley to open a corridor to connect Nagorno-Karabagh with Armenia.³⁵ "With the 'Lachin corridor' open, volunteers, arms, and supplies flowed in to Karabakh . . . Lachin remains one of the most problematic issues in the Karabakh dispute. For Azerbaijanis, it is a fully Azerbaijani region that cannot be subject to compromise; for Armenians, it is a 'road of life' that cannot be relinquished."³⁶ Nagorno-Karabagh Armenians claim that most of the fighting took place between the ethnic Nagorno-

Azerbaijan Republic. Irena Sargsyan, *International Mediation in Theory and Practice: Lessons of Nagorno-Karabakh*, Armenian Center for National and International Studies, 2003
http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00004733/01/INTERNATIONAL_MEDIATION_IN_THEORY_AND_PRACTICE.pdf (accessed April 23, 2011)

³¹ Bruno Coppieters, *Contested Borders In The Caucasus* (Brussels: VUB University Press, 1996), 28.

³² Ibid.

³³ See Appendix G for map of Nagorno-Karabagh before the Armenian occupation and Appendix H for map of Nagorno-Karabagh and surrounding Azeri regions after the Armenian occupation.

³⁴ *The Europa World Year Book*, 457.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 120.

Karabagh Armenians and Azeris.³⁷ However, it is indisputable that Armenian government sent troops on rotational basis to help their ethnic kin, while officially denying any involvement to avoid responsibility for the actions of the Nagorno-Karabagh fighters on the battlefield.³⁸

By the end of 1992, the Nagorno-Karabagh council changed its policy of reunification with Armenia to a policy of self determination, seeking complete independence from both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This strategy also helped Armenia to counter any claims by the Azeri government that Armenia was occupying Azeri territories.³⁹

In late 1992, Azeri forces launched several successful counterassaults and recaptured some of the occupied territories, but political turmoil in Baku changed the course of the Azeri victories. In 1993, Azeri military leaders pulled out their fighters from the front in an attempt to undermine the Azeri political leadership and gain control of the government.⁴⁰ This left the Azeri village of Kelbajar, north of the Lachin valley completely unprotected. In April, 1993, Armenian forces captured Kelbajar and by autumn, four surrounding Azeri towns around Nagorno-Karabagh were completely abandoned by Azeri civilians.⁴¹

³⁷ Bruno Coppieters, *Contested Borders In The Caucasus* (Brussels: VUB University Press, 1996), 36.

³⁸ Cornell, 92.

³⁹ Coppieters, 28. Cornell, 92.

⁴⁰ De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 121.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 122.

In October, as Armenian forces took control of Zangilan region close to the Iranian border, thousands of Azeri civilians began to cross into Iran.⁴² Over one thousand Iranian troops entered Azeri territory and established a buffer zone to keep the Azeris from crossing the border.⁴³ “Naturally this led to worries in Moscow, but more especially in Ankara, over the danger of an escalated conflict. Fifty thousand Turkish troops were amassed at the Armenian border, and the conflict was probably at its highest ever risk of escalation.”⁴⁴ Although Armenians faced international condemnation for occupying vast amounts of Azeri territories, the real war began when the Soviet era politician, Heidar Aliev, came to power as the third president of Azerbaijan.

In typical Soviet style, Aliev took complete control of the political order by arresting opposition leaders or forcing them to flee the country.⁴⁵ Promising to restore the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Aliev reorganized the military and in December of 1993, Azeri forces began a military campaign to liberate the occupied territories, but suffered four thousand casualties within the first two months of the fighting.⁴⁶ The Azeri government agreed to a Russian brokered ceasefire, which came into effect in May of 1994. The Armenians had full control of seven Azeri regions, giving them a buffer zone at the front-line of Nagorno-Karabagh and complete control of the four regions, Kelbajar, Lachin, Qubati and Zangilan which completely connected Nagorno-Karabagh to

⁴² Cornell, 105.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Thomas De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 123.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Armenia.⁴⁷ Although the ceasefire has been observed since 1994, sporadic violations continue to claim casualties on both sides. The number of refugees from the conflict is believed to have reached one million Azeris with as many as 18,000 people killed during the whole conflict.⁴⁸

Some have argued that the Armenian victories achieved very little since the Azeri blockade and the continued war left the Armenian economy in shambles,⁴⁹ while others have argued that “Armenians managed to de facto alter internationally recognized borders by force, without even receiving a direct condemnation by any major power”⁵⁰ Thousands of casualties on both sides left both Armenia and Azerbaijan in economic shambles. The scope of the next chapter will examine the frozen conflict and the post-war conditions within the region specifically exploring the interests of the main actors Russia, Turkey, Iran and the United States which have complicated the resolution process of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.

⁴⁷ *The Europa World Year Book*, 457.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 458.

⁴⁹ Coppieters, 37.

⁵⁰ Cornell, 107.

CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1994

Frozen Conflict – post-war conditions and the Status of Nagorno-Karabagh

The 1994, Russian-brokered ceasefire between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces was viewed by regional powers as an explicit opportunity to push for a final resolution to this conflict. However, a formal peace agreement between the two warring nations was never achieved. The absence of third party monitors at the frontline in Nagorno-Karabagh has placed the burden of maintaining the ceasefire agreement solely on the belligerents. The de facto independent state of Nagorno-Karabagh has not formally been recognized by any nation including Armenia. In reality it is militarily, economically and politically dependent on Armenia.¹ Although the Azeri government has refused to accept the defacto Nagorno-Karabagh government, the Azerbaijani authorities have alluded that they will consider dealing with the Nagorno-Karabagh de facto government if Armenia agrees not to assist Nagorno-Karabagh forces in any fashion.² Azeri calls for Armenia to stay out of Nagorno-Karabagh have been ignored; Armenian forces have been hardening the defenses on the mountainous terrain of the Nagorno-Karabagh frontline, including mining the entire border. The Armenians currently have a position of distinct military advantage against Azerbaijan.³

¹ Gary K. Bertsch, Cassidy Craft, Scott A Jones and Michael Beck, *Crossroads and Conflict, Security and Foreign Policy In The Caucasus And Central Asia* (London: Routledge, 2000), 173.

² Ibid.

³ International Crisis Group, *Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War*, Policy Briefing N-60, February 8, 2011
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/caucasus/B60%20Armenia%20and%20Azerbaijan%20---%20Preventing%20War.ashx> (accessed May 22, 2011), 13.

Up to this point, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have chosen the political battlefield to continue their fight over Nagorno-Karabagh and have compiled evidence to justify ownership and convince the international community that each states claim to Nagorno-Karabagh has more validity than other state's claims. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have increased their efforts to solidify their defensive positions and strengthen their offensive capabilities by manipulating the regional powers to guarantee support in case of a renewed conflict.

Initially, Armenian diasporans successfully convinced some Western political leaders to support their cause. In 1992, under the Freedom Support Act, section 907a, the United States restricted foreign aid to Azerbaijan for blockades and offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabagh.⁴ By 1994, the re-introduction of the Azerbaijani Caspian Sea energy reserves as an alternative source of oil to the Western markets gave the Azeri politicians the strategic edge.⁵ Both Turkey and the United States were quick to seize this opportunity to create an alliance with the Azeri government. There were three important factors for this decision: securing energy resources from Azerbaijan, countering Iran's increasing influence in the region, and denying Russia complete dominance over the region.⁶ Despite the unresolved conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh, the Azeri leadership was able to use the Russian-brokered ceasefire to its advantage and portray the security situation stable enough to draw in foreign oil

⁴ Cornell, 368.

⁵ Ibid., 382.

⁶ Adem Ogultarhan, *Iran's Nuclear Program: The US Misses Opportunities? – An Examination of US Policies in the Middle East and Implications of those Policies on the US Global Position*, Turkish Journal of International Relations, Volume 9, No. 1, Spring 2010, 124.

investors.⁷ In September of 1994, the former president of Azerbaijan, Haidar Aliyev, negotiated a deal hailed by Western observers as the “Contract of the Century” that paved the way for Western actors to explore three offshore fields in the Caspian Sea.⁸ The 8 billion dollar oil contract promised a 100 billion dollar profit over a 30 year span.⁹ By September 2002 the construction of the pipeline was underway from Baku to the Turkish city of Ceyhan.¹⁰ The United States and Turkey were instrumental in pressuring Azerbaijan to exclude any concessions to Iran and Russia by forcing the three main oil pipelines to bypass Russia and Armenia.

Russian and Turkish national interests over control of the Azeri oil resources were conflicting and the passive presence of the United States aggravated the Russian politicians. Russia considers the breakaway republics from the Soviet Union as its inherent domain. Russian politicians have used the term “Near Abroad” as their area of influence and have used this reason to legitimize their persistence in establishing military bases throughout the former Soviet Republics.¹¹ By forming a strong political and economic alliance with Turkey and the United States, Azeri politicians successfully avoided granting Russia military basing rights, which infuriated Russia’s political elite. They feared Russia’s economic and political dominance was slipping away to western

⁷ Cornell, 373.

⁸ Thomas De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 172.

⁹ Azeri.com, “Oil and Gas in Azerbaijan; Oil Production.” Energy Information Administration. <http://www.high-interest-deposits.com/azerbaijan-economy.html> (accessed March 29, 2011).

¹⁰ Thomas De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 178.

¹¹ Jim MacDougall, *Russian Policy in the Transcaucasian “Near Abroad” The case of Azerbaijan*, *Journal of Post Soviet Democratization*, Volume 5 No. 1 (Winter 1997), <http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/bin/pdf/DEM%2005-01%20macdougall.pdf> (accessed May 21, 2011), 91.

nations.¹² The oil revenue that the Azeri government would soon enjoy as a result of the “Contract of the Century” was bound to upset the geopolitical and security balance of the region; but more significantly, circumventing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines to avoid Armenian territory could only serve to push Armenia further into Russia’s sphere of influence.¹³

Since the commencement of the oil deal, Azerbaijan has used the oil revenues to increase its military budget each year, which is scheduled to reach 3.1 billion dollars by 2011. On January 14, 2011, in reference to the Azeri military budget, the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev¹⁴ announced that while the future of Armenia will depend on foreign aid, Azerbaijan will allocate as much money as necessary into its military organizations to reinstate Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.¹⁵ The increased military spending has given the Azerbaijani military and political leaders a strong sense of confidence that its military is capable of settling the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict by force.¹⁶

In August of 2010, in an effort to counterbalance the Azeri military spending, Armenia signed a deal extending Russian military presence in Armenia until 2044 in exchange for guarantees of military supplies and equipment.¹⁷ Hence, Armenia

¹² Cornell, 380.

¹³ Ibid., 364.

¹⁴ Ilham Alyev is the son of late, former president Haidar Aliyev.

¹⁵ Mina Muradova, “Azerbaijan Boosts Defense Production,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, January 19, 2011, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5482/print> (accessed February 23, 2011)

¹⁶ Cornell, 403.

¹⁷ Jorge Benitez, *The Geo-Strategic Impact of Russian-Armenian Defense Deal*, NATO Source Alliance Newsblog, August 26, 2010 <http://www.acus.org/natosource/geo-strategic-impact-russian-armenian-defense-deal> (accessed May 20, 2011)

strengthened the Russo-Armenian alliance to counterbalance the Turkish-Azeri and U.S. alliance in the region. To counter the Russo-Armenian military alliance, in December 2010, Azerbaijan signed a mutual military and strategic partnership agreement with Turkey for a period of 10 years which pledges to support one another in any way possible.¹⁸ However the Azeri politicians are fully aware that a NATO military presence in Azerbaijan is sure to instigate political and military action by Russia and Iran, and up to this point have avoided hosting Turkish military bases in Azerbaijan.¹⁹

CSCE / OSCE

Even when the republics declared their independence from the Soviet Union the United Nations was hesitant to intervene in the Armenian-Azeri conflict due to an overload of conflict resolutions it was dealing with in the Balkan states.²⁰ The U.N. delegated the mediation efforts to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which, after the collapse of the Soviet Union was looking to fill a new role.²¹ In March of 1991, CSCE formed an eleven member committee comprised of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Netherlands, Finland, Turkey, and the U.S. to be the primary mediating organization for the Nagorno-Karabagh

¹⁸ Shahin Abbasov, *Azerbaijan-Turkey Military Pact Signals Impatience with Minsk Talks-Analysts*, Eurasianet January 18, 2011 <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62732> (accessed May 21, 2011)

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Coppieters, 105.

²¹ Created during the Cold-War the CSCE's purpose was to help promote dialogue between the East and the West. Svante E. Cornell, *small nations and great powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*. (England: Curzon Press, 2001), 108.

conflict and planned a peace conference in Minsk.²² The mediating team which became known as the “Minsk Group” was an odd assortment. Some members, such as Italy, Finland and Sweden, had no interest in the South Caucasus. Therefore, they “could only act as mediators in the true sense of the word; they had no incentives, no carrots or sticks to convince the belligerents to adopt a more compromising attitude.”²³ However other CSCE members such as Russia, Turkey and the United States used the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict to justify their presence in the region and to compete and to gain the advantage for access to Azeri untapped, energy resources.²⁴ Russia, as the most active and dominant player, was determined to keep international organizations such as the CSCE and other nations out of the Caucasus. Russia undermined the CSCE’s role by conducting sideline mediations between Armenia and Azerbaijan to re-establish its hegemonic dominance over the region, keep U.S. and Turkey out of Caucasus, and re-establish control over the former Soviet border with Turkey and Iran.²⁵ In doing so, Russia was aiming to take control of the Azeri oil reserves and sales to Turkey and Europe.

In December 1994, at the CSCE Budapest summit, the CSCE changed its name to the Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and integrated its mediation efforts with Russia’s.²⁶ Russia, the United States, and France were given the three permanent co-chairman of the Minsk Group. Each of these states, however, had very

²² Cornell, 110.

²³ Ibid., 111.

²⁴ Thomas De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 181.

²⁵ Cornell, 113.

²⁶ Ibid.

different positions and views on how to deal with the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, and more importantly, each member had its own agenda and interests to look after. This situation made the mission of the Minsk Group secondary and largely impossible to accomplish.²⁷

OSCE: Wrong Focus

The efforts of the OSCE have been unfocused in dealing with Nagorno-Karabagh by offering economic incentives to lure the belligerents to compromise. Yet all solutions have neglected to address the historic origins of the conflict.²⁸ Rather than focus on long term interests, needs, and security concerns of the two parties, the religious and historic mistrust has polarized the two populations, who accept nothing less than full control over Nagorno-Karabagh.²⁹ “The sequence of peace plans proposed by the OSCE in the past few years are a reflection of the tendency to concentrate on the parties’ positions As the parties’ positions are conflicting and mutually exclusive, every plan would imply unilateral concessions...”³⁰

Also, the lack of communication between warring parties and the Minsk Group co-chairs have resulted in shifting OSCE policies, destroying any progress towards a

²⁷ Cornell, 113.

²⁸ Chanda Allana Leckie, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Obstacles and Opportunities for a Settlement” (master’s thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2005), 52.

²⁹ Bertsch et al., 184.

³⁰ Nadia Milanova, “The Territory-Identity Nexus in the Conflict over Nagorno Karabakh: Implications for OSCE Peace Efforts,” *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, Issue 2/2003 <http://www.hrwf.net/Joom/images/reports/2003-2008/2003%20nadia%20nagorno%20karabakh.pdf> (accessed March 11, 2011)

settlement.³¹ The OSCE, Minsk Group has proposed ad-hoc,³² packaged, and phased solutions to deal with the deadlock between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which is perceived by warring parties as contradictory and a temporary fix.³³ The Azeris prefer the phased solution, which requires the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the occupied territories with the future of Nagorno-Karabagh to be determined at a later date; Armenians prefer a packaged solution, which suggests all steps be taken simultaneously.³⁴ Armenians have insisted that the Azeris must decide the future of Nagorno-Karabagh before any Armenian military forces can be withdrawn from the seven occupied regions of Azerbaijan.³⁵

Behind closed doors, the Armenian and Azerbaijani politicians understand their mutual concerns and verbally have agreed upon major steps each would undertake to normalize the situation. But any hints of concession by the presidents of Armenia or Azerbaijan have been perceived by their respective populations as political incompetence and weakness.³⁶ Moreover, previous attempts by politicians to settle the conflict by compromise have proven to be a career ending mistake. In 1998 for example, when the Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan adopted a compromising stance on Nagorno-Karabagh, he was ousted by a coup, proving that the political opposition forces and the

³¹ Chanda Allana Leckie, *The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Obstacles and Opportunities for a Settlement*, Thesis document, (Blacksburg: 2005), 24.

³² The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, *Report on the 14th Academy on the OSCE June 20-July2, 2010*, Peace Center Burg Schlaining, August 2010 http://aspr.ac.at/conflict_management/osce_academy/osce_report10.pdf (accessed May 21, 2011), 33.

³³ Bertsch et al., 177. The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, 33.

³⁴ Cornell, 123.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Thomas De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 128.

population of Armenia were not ready to accept a settlement.³⁷ The current presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan have avoided making the same mistake. In April of 2001, during a Peace conference in Key West, Florida, the political leaders of both Azerbaijan and Armenia came close to an agreement, but the political opposition groups to bolster their own popularity were relentless to deduce the results of the OSCE negotiations in a negative limelight.³⁸ As a result, the ongoing OSCE negotiations have been conducted in secrecy which has increased public skepticism about the intentions of the political elite.³⁹ The presidents of both Armenia and Azerbaijan have used this lack of transparency of the negotiation process in their favor. Both have emerged out of the OSCE meetings with apportioned interpretations of victory and announcements portraying the other as the losing party.⁴⁰ The disorder created by these conflictions has severely deteriorated the diplomatic process. “Sabre-rattling rhetoric” by both Armenian and Azeri leaders has increased the public expectations of war.⁴¹

A protracted war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is sure to affect the geopolitical and economic factors of the region including disruption of Caspian Sea oil and gas production which certainly will upset the interests of the larger players.⁴² To suppose that humanity will take lessons from history and change course is grossly naive. Although Russia, Iran, United States, and Turkey have been able to avoid a direct conflict

³⁷ Cornell, 139.

³⁸ Rexane Dehdashit-Rasmussen, “The conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh: Causes, the Status of Negotiations, and Prospects,” <http://www.core-hamburg.de/documents/yearbook/english/06/Rasmussen-en.pdf> (accessed March 11,2011), 205. De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 129.

³⁹ Leckie, 56.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 57.

⁴¹ Dehdashit-Rasmussen,

⁴² De Wall, *Black Garden*, 279.

over Nagorno-Karabagh, relying on each nation's self restraint is a tremendous risk which can have disastrous consequences. Maintaining the status-quo of the conflict has helped Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the United States to advance their own strategic interests in the region at the expense of allowing escalating tensions between the Armenian and Azerbaijani nations. Since 1988, United States has countered Iran's involvement in the region by encouraging Turkey's role, especially in securing Azeri oil resources, and in the process also containing Russian domination of the region.⁴³ Russia has countered the U.S. role by fostering Turkish-Russian relationship through economic interdependence, while manipulating Iran to counter Turkey's Pan-Turkish ambitions in Azerbaijan.⁴⁴ Iran has used the Russian influence in the region to counter U.S. and NATO basing in Azerbaijan while simultaneously developing Turkish-Iranian economic relationship.⁴⁵ Officially Turkey, Russia, Iran and the United States have announced their commitment to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict peacefully within the framework of the OSCE however, a small change in an already tense environment may seriously undermine the strategic interests of all of these regional players.⁴⁶

⁴³ Chorbajian, 244.

⁴⁴ Coppieters, 174.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶Gareth Chappell, Turkey, Russia and Iran: *Common Interests, Common Positions?* Center for International Relations, Reports and Analyses, July 2010
http://csm.org.pl/fileadmin/files/Biblioteka_CSM/Raporty_i_analizy/2010/Reports%20and%20Analyses_Turkey_Russia_Iran.pdf, (accessed May 21, 2011), 12.

Brinkmanship in Caucasus

The current frozen status of Nagorno-Karabagh conflict is not as stable as it appears.⁴⁷ Armenians and Azerbaijanis have used rhetoric, accusing the opposing side on charges of discrimination, racism, bigotry, hatred, mistrust, qualms, injustice, intimidation, and coercion in an effort to classify, categorize, and dehumanize the opponent, a tactic which dates back to the overall tone in the First and Second World Wars. “The two governments have so far undertaken virtually nothing to prepare their populations for the necessity of concessions.”⁴⁸ Both presidents have manipulated memory and identity to maintain the status-quo of the frozen conflict and through corruption and brutal oppression they have managed to remain in their political positions.⁴⁹ However, there is mounting, external and internal political pressure to end corruption and promote democratic way of life in both countries. This may force the politicians to rally political support and exacerbate ethnic national actions to resume the conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh and divert the focus of their populations from seeking change to fighting for a national cause: a miscalculation and provocation which could easily lead to war.⁵⁰

The following recent events capture the danger. On February 25, 2010, Safar Abiyev, the Defense Minister of Azerbaijan, told the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs that

⁴⁷ Dehdashit-Rasmussen, 206.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Thomas De Wall, *Black Garden*, 282.

⁵⁰ Stephen M. Saideman, R. William Ayres, *For Kin or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 7.

“Azerbaijan is seriously preparing to liberate its territories.”⁵¹ This statement started a slew of similar inflammatory rhetoric and increased the number of sniper attacks and counterattacks on the Nagorno-Karabagh border, with the heaviest Azeri attack on June 18, 2010 that resulted in four Armenian and two Azeri soldiers killed.⁵² On July 7, 2010, President Aliyev warned at a public event, “this is the last chance for Armenia to leave the occupied lands voluntarily for the sake of its own future and its own security.”⁵³ On December 1, 2010, the Armenian president addressed the OSCE co-chairs in Astana indicating Armenia’s position on the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict by stating that, “Azerbaijan has no legal, historical, or moral right to lay any claim on Nagorno-Karabagh. Armenia is strongly against a military settlement of the conflict. However, in the case of Azerbaijani military aggression Armenia will have no alternative but recognize Nagorno-Karabagh as an independent state, as it has no future as part of Azerbaijan.”⁵⁴

Azerbaijani diplomats have begun a heavy effort to increase Armenia’s economic isolation by trying to convince the government of Georgia to deny Armenian businesses easy access to the Georgian coastal city of Kabuleti. On February 27, 2011, the Azerbaijani Ambassador to Georgia, Namig Aliyev, alluded to the possibility that

⁵¹ Asparez Post, “Azerbaijan Warns of a ‘Great War’ With Armenia,” February 25, 2010 <http://asbarez.com/77827/azerbaijan-warns-of-a-great-war-with-armenia/> (accessed May 22, 2011)

⁵² Karine Ohanyan and Sabuhi Mammadli, “Karabakh Clash Follows Failed Talks,” IWPR.net June 25, 2010, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/karabakh-clash-follows-failed-talks> (accessed May 22)

⁵³ Asparez Post, “Last Chance For Armenia, Threatens Aliyev,” July 7, 2010 <http://asbarez.com/83135/%E2%80%98last-chance-for-armenia%E2%80%99-threatens-aliyev/> (accessed May 22, 2011)

⁵⁴ News.am, “Armenian President Leaves OSCE Summit in Astana”, December 02, 2010, <http://news.am/eng/news/40169.html>, (accessed March 07, 2011)

Armenians are on a “Pan-Armenian” quest to expand their territory and gain access to the Black Sea.⁵⁵ The Armenia-Georgia route was the only direct line of operation for supplies and equipment during the Armenian-Azeri war. If it is eliminated, it will restrict Armenia to only one land based supply source, Iran. The Azeri actions in Georgia are viewed by the Armenians as an effort by the Azeri government to further extend its economic blockade on Armenia and weaken Armenia’s ability to resist an Azeri attack on Nagorno-Karabagh.

On March 5, 2011, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev invited the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents to a meeting in Sochi to renew talks. Although both presidents promised to increase the number of diplomatic dialogues and meetings, the atmosphere of trust between two nations no longer exists.⁵⁶

From these events it became clear that in the words of one observer, “No comparable conflict in the world today arguably has the potential to involve as many regional and global powers as does the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.”⁵⁷ Indeed, Russia, the U.S., Turkey and Iran are the big regional and global powers with important interests tied to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict that may blunder unintentionally into war.

Briefly exploring the interests of the most dominant regional powers, Russia and Turkey, followed by a short summary of U.S. and Iranian interests in the Caucasus region

⁵⁵ Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, “Azerbaijani Official Urges Georgia to Curb Armenian Access To Black Sea,” RFERL.org February 27, 2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan_urgues_georgia_to_curb_armenia_sea_access/2322587.html (accessed May 22, 2011)

⁵⁶ Cornell, 408.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

will help identify the conflicting and competing issues that shape the future of the frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh.

CHAPTER 4: COMPETING AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF REGIONAL POWERS

One of the primary arguments throughout this paper identifies the southern Caucasus as the crossroads where the interests of Russia, Turkey, United States and Iran collide over three primary issues: control, access, and oil.¹ Controlling the stability or instability of the regional security gives the dominant nation power and prestige as the Key Player.² Establishing control over an area gives legitimacy for military presence and opportunity to maneuver. Control and access together help construct oil pipelines and secure transport routes to access resources and oil.³ Today, in the Caucasus there is a global contest between Russia, Turkey, United States and Iran for control and influence of the regional stability and oil.⁴ Exploring the competing interests of the regional powers will help understand how Russia, Turkey, the United States and Iran have used the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict for geopolitical control of the Caucasus.

Russia: Aggressive Power Broker

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the southern Caucasus was transformed into an inter-ethnic battleground until in 1993, when Russia returned to the arena to restore order in its near abroad.⁵ The potential of spill-over effect from the Nagorno-Karabagh

¹ Bertsch et al., 140.

² Ibid., 149.

³ Cornell, 386-387.

⁴ MacDougall, 90.

⁵ Coppieters, 94.

conflict threatened Russia's security.⁶ The potential of losing the oil-rich Azeri territories to regional powers convinced the Russian politicians that Russia must assert its dominance and keep its military forces stationed throughout the Caucasus.⁷ Russia used the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict to keep control over the stability and the instability of the region to open a dialogue with Turkey and draw it into its area of influence.⁸

In essence, the primary Russian interests in the Caucasus are territorial and economic security.⁹ President Boris Yeltsin, made it clear that countering the "NATO eastern expansion" as a top priority in Russia's National Security Strategy. Russia's fears were interpreted and dismissed by western analysts as Russia's inability to move past its Cold War insecurities. The potential that Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia could join NATO only reinforced Russian fears to keep external powers out of the Caucasian region.¹⁰ Russia and Iran both became highly skeptical of Turkey's intentions for engaging with the Caucasian nations. Turkey's involvement was perceived by Russia and Iran as another attempt by the United States and the Western nations to enclose them.¹¹ Russia's inability to maintain political and economic control over Azerbaijan was seen by Russian politicians as a major strategic loss.

⁶ Coppieters, 94.

⁷ Ibid., 96-97.

⁸ Bertsch et al., 210.

⁹ Coppieters, 94-96.

¹⁰ John A. Mowchan, "The Militarization of the Collective Security Treaty Organization" Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, volume 6-09 (July 2009) http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/publications/IP_6_09_Militarization_of_the_CSTO.pdf (accessed February 23, 2011): 3.

¹¹ Cornell, 381.

Russia gradually created a strong Turkish dependency on Russian energy resources. “With regard to the economic realm, Turkish-Russian relations developed into a substantial factor. With a trade volume of 25 billion dollars, Russia became Turkey’s second most important trading partner.”¹² Although to most observers, the Russian and Turkish relationship may seem symbiotic, in reality however, the Russians have successfully avoided dependency on Turkey, even in the midst of taking control of the region.¹³ Russia has been very active in the region primarily to keep United States and other Western powers from playing a dynamic role. “Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited Syria and Turkey, taking a very large entourage with him to work on trade and military cooperation agreements. In effect, these meetings marked another step in the creation of an anti-American alliance in the region with Russian backing.”¹⁴

To balance Turkey’s ambitions, Russia has begun to support Iran by agreeing to sell civil nuclear technology and some military weapons.¹⁵ Russia has been successful in convincing Iran that by mutual cooperation both nations can benefit from the Caspian oilfields. Russia has not used similar measures when dealing with Turkey.¹⁶ Russia is aware that Turkey and Iran are competing over Azeri oil and gas resources and,

¹² Christian Eichenmuller, “*Examining the Turkish Russian Rapprochement*,” The Green Political Foundation, February 1, 2011 <http://www.boell.de/worldwide/europenorthamerica/europe-transatlantic-examining-the-turkish-russian-rapprochement-11088.html>, (accessed March 07, 2011)

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Richard Javad Heydarian, “*Iran-Turkey-Syria: An Alliance of Convenience*,” Foreign Policy in Focus, July 19, 2010 http://www.fpif.org/articles/iran-turkey-syria_an_alliance_of_convenience, (accessed March 8, 2011)

¹⁵ Congressional Research Service, *U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress*, January 2011 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34655.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2011), 10-11.

¹⁶ Cornell, 327.

accordingly it has been able to maintain a tense strategic environment by taking blatant steps to undermine Turkey's relationship with Iran.¹⁷

Although both Russia and Turkey oppose Iran's progress toward becoming a nuclear power, Turkey has made attempts to assist Iran in its ambitions while, in June of 2010, Russia undermined the Turkish-Iranian relationship by voting for U.N. sanctions against Iran's nuclear program.¹⁸ Compared to Iran, Russia perceives Turkey as a greater threat. Russia and Armenia have come to terms with the fact that the strategic terrain is such that Armenia has little choice but to develop a strong bond with Iran.¹⁹ The closure of the Russo-Georgian border after the 2008 war over Abkhazia restrained Armenia's access to Russian supplies through only air shipments, leaving Armenia stranded without energy resources for days. Russia has encouraged Armenian Iranian diplomatic and economic relations in contrast to Turkish Armenian relations. Although Russia continually builds its relations with Turkey, Iran, and Azerbaijan, Russia is very mindful that "Islam's borders are bloody, and so are its innards."²⁰

The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 re-established Russia's military assertiveness and signaled that Russia was once again powerful enough to confront other regional powers.²¹ It was a sobering moment for Turkey, the U.S., Azerbaijan, and other western nations that Russia was able and willing to take military action to maintain its dominance

¹⁷ Heydarian, "Iran-Turkey-Syria: An Alliance of Convenience,"

¹⁸ Chappell, 12.

¹⁹ Cornell, 328.

²⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks 2003), 258.

²¹ Thomas De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 222.

over the Caucasus.²² Russia's bold assertiveness and the U.S. deteriorating relations between the U.S. and Azerbaijan have forced the Azeri leadership to question the western alliance. "First, President Ilham Aliyev was not invited to the Nuclear Summit in Washington in April 2010. . . .In response Aliyev cancelled the military exercises with the US. . . .Second, the US signed its Strategic Partnership Chapters with Ukraine, Georgia, the Czech Republic and Poland but not with Azerbaijan."²³ Since the war with Georgia in 2008, Russia has "emerged as the indisputable key-holder of regional peace."²⁴

Turkey Free at Last

During the Cold War, United States economic and military aid to Turkey helped push back Soviet aggression in support of the U.S. containment policy, but the end of the Cold War seemed to diminish Turkey's role as a strategic ally.²⁵ Turkey was eager to take advantage of the opportunities presented by former Soviet republics to maintain its relevance however, Turkey was apprehensive about the friction and instability that could emerge from competing regional interests of Russia and Iran. Turkey knew that Russia and Iran considered the southern Caucasus vital to their national security interests. To avoid destabilizing the balance of power between these existing powers, Turkey engaged

²² De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 222.

²³ Nona Mikhalidze, *The Azerbaijan-Russia-Turkey Energy Triangle and its Impact on the Future of Nagorno-Karabakh*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Documenti IAI 10, September 2010, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai1018.pdf> (accessed May28, 2011), 5.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ U.S. policy during the cold war toward the Communist states to keep them within their current borders and contain the threat and spread of communism.

in building a stronger diplomatic relationship with Russia, Iran and Armenia. The efforts of Turkey to renew diplomatic relations with Armenia in 2009 were embraced by the Western nations as a major development for regional stability. The diplomatic momentum had reached a point allowing a friendly soccer match between Armenian and Turkish national teams.²⁶ However, Turkey's rapprochement with Armenia was largely viewed by Russia and Iran as an encroachment by NATO and the United States.²⁷

Turkey's primary interests in the Caucasus region was to become a key supplier of energy resources from the Caspian oil reserves and unite the Turkish speaking nations of the former Soviet Union.²⁸ Turkey and Azerbaijan were quick to identify each other as one nation with shared linguistic and ethnic ties.²⁹ Economically, Turkey promptly seized the opportunity to flood the newly emerged former Soviet Republics with Turkish goods and executed steps to bring the Caucasian nations under its economic influence.³⁰

The Armenian-Azeri war prompted Turkey to close its borders with Armenia until a settlement could be reached over the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict with Azerbaijan.³¹ Turkey attempted to mediate between the warring parties to maintain cross border stability but its primary objective was to secure access to Azeri oil. Supported by the United States and Western nations, Turkey was heavily involved in the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, delivering oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean

²⁶ De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 225.

²⁷ Cornell, 314.

²⁸ Coppieters, 182.

²⁹ Michael P Croissant, *The Armenia Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications* (Westport, CT: Praegar Publishers, 1998), 58.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Cornell, 304.

Sea while completely circumventing Armenia, Russia and Iran out of the platform.³² The Azeri-Turkish cooperation, in large part, solidified Russo-Armenian-Iranian alliance.³³

As the U.S. increasingly relied on Turkey to conduct regional military operations during the Gulf war against Iraq and post-9/11 events, Turkey in turn leveraged its position to advance Turkey's national interests. The turning point that tested the US-Turkish relationship was marked in 2003, when Turkey refused to allow the United States to launch a ground offensive from Turkey into Iraq.³⁴ In 2007, Turkey successfully manipulated its new found power by threatening to close the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey if the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee endorsed a resolution recognizing the Ottoman killings of 1915 as genocide.³⁵ Turkey went as far as to recall its ambassador back to Ankara for consultations, sending a strategic message to the U.S. domestic policy makers that Turkey would not tolerate such endeavors.

As Turkey continually gained regional importance, it began to place the Western national interests second to the Turkish national interests. Turkish-Israeli relationship worsened since 2009, forcing Turkey to strengthen alliances with Russia, Iran, and other anti-western nations.³⁶ Turkey has gradually aligned its priorities to focus on its own national interests followed by, engaging kin nations with ethnic ties (Azerbaijan), followed by nations which share common values (Russia, Iran and Syria). Turkey has

³² De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 178.

³³ Cornell, 389.

³⁴ F. Stephen Larrabee, *Troubled Partnership: U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change*, Rand Corporation Project Air Force, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2010), 12.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 55.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 43-44.

begun to see the U.S. anti-Iranian influence as burdensome.³⁷ U.S. and western politicians have been slow to acknowledge that Turkey's change of strategy in building alliances envisions Russia and Iran as an important element to regional stability. Turkey's renewed diplomatic relationship with Russia and Iran signals Turkey's deteriorating relationship with the west. "The longer it takes us to recognize that Turkey is no longer an ally, the more damage Turkey will be able to do to our national security."³⁸

Turkey's new role in the region, as an independent country willing and able to make decisions without first consulting with its western allies, has reestablished its place as a regional player in the Caucasus. "Turkey's shifting foreign policy is making its prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a hero to the Arab world, and is openly challenging the way the United States manages its two most pressing issues in the region, Iran's nuclear program and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process."³⁹ Turkey's national interests and United States' national interests are no longer mutual but rather competitive especially in regards to the Caucasus region.⁴⁰

As a result of Turkey's independence in regional affairs, the Russian and Iranian expectation that United States will be able to control or prevent Turkey from military involvement in a future Nagorno-Karabagh conflict may prove to be false. "Turkey is now a vibrant, competitive democracy with an economy that would rank as the sixth

³⁷ Larrabee, 34-35.

³⁸ Patrick Goodenough, "NATO Member Turkey Solidified its ties with Iran and Syria", CNS News.com, February 11, 2011, <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/nato-member-turkey-solidifies-its-ties-i>, (accessed March 07, 2011)

³⁹ Sabrina Tavernise and Michael Slackman, "Turkey Goes From Pliable Ally to Thorn for U.S." The New York Times, June 8, 2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/world/middleeast/09turkey.html>, (accessed March 8, 2011)

⁴⁰ Chappell, 4.

largest in Europe . . . independent of the United States.”⁴¹ Like Israel, Turkey sees itself as a military and economic power and is willing to use any means necessary to protect its national interests and regional allies. Turkey proved its military assertiveness at the height of the Nagorno-Karabagh dispute when it massed troops along the northern border of Turkey and threatened that it too would not stand idle if Armenia attacked Nakhijevan, the ancient Armenian lands annexed to Azerbaijan during the Soviet period.⁴²

Turkey has used a “Muslim solidarity” message in an effort to improve its relations with Iran and other Muslim nations. “While Iran and Turkey’s strategic interests have converged in recent history, the root of the contention between the two states is buried deep in their past For centuries, both the Ottomans and the Persians competed for influence in the Caucasus and West Asia, waged intermittent wars against one another.”⁴³ A strong Turkish-Azeri alliance on Iranian borders presents the potential for a domestic instability within Iran which in the past was the cause for Iran’s unconventional alliance with Armenia.⁴⁴ A brief examination of the Iranian-Armenian alliance will show that this relationship is essentially superficial.

Iran: Flirting With the Enemy

The Armenian and Iranian ties are based on mutual political and national security interests. As mentioned previously, Armenia experienced a full blockade from both Turkey and Azerbaijan during the war over Nagorno-Karabagh. The Russo-Georgian

⁴¹ Tavernise and Slackman, “Turkey Goes From Pliable Ally to Thorn for U.S.”

⁴² Cornell, 105.

⁴³ Heydarian, “Iran-Turkey-Syria: An Alliance of Convenience.”

⁴⁴ Coppieters, 169.

relationship, which soured over time, prevented Russian assistance from reaching Armenia through Georgian territory. Armenia was left with only one option, seeking and accepting assistance from Iran. Meanwhile the former Azeri president, who was pro-Turkish oriented rather than pro-Iranian oriented, began advocating unification of [Post-Soviet] northern Azerbaijan with southern Azerbaijan, which is part of present day Iran.⁴⁵ This not only prompted the closure of Azeri diplomatic missions in Iran but also compelled the Iranian leadership to reconsider the strategic environment with a Western leaning Azerbaijan at their border.⁴⁶ Allowing Azerbaijan to slip into Turkey's area of influence was seen as an imminent threat to Iran's national security; a notion which has made the country notably uneasy.⁴⁷ Iran's two strategic interests with the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict became to control Azerbaijan by securing the status-quo of the frozen conflict and preventing Turkey from dominating the region.⁴⁸

As a matter of course, Iran's decision to open borders with Armenia was not a matter of assisting Armenia over Azerbaijan, but rather a specific motion to impel the Azeris to focus on the fight in Nagorno-Karabagh, thus eliminating the Azeri threat to Iran's territorial integrity.⁴⁹ "Worried that the Turks might influence Iran's huge Turkic Azeri minority, pre-revolution leader Reza Shah and his successors embarked on a program of 'Persianization' and political centralization at the cost of the Azeri's demands

⁴⁵ See Appendix F for ethnic map of Iran depicting Iranian-Azeri minority

⁴⁶ Bertsch et al., 41.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 147.

⁴⁸ Coppieters, 169-170.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

for federal autonomy.”⁵⁰ On the international stage, Iran’s strategic approach was successful since the attention of western countries shifted from domestic instability in northern Iran to focus on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh. Iran rendered assistance to Armenia at a decisive point, without which the current status of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict would have adjourned quite differently. Armenia and Iran have since progressed by improving their relationship. Iranian Armenian diplomatic and economic cooperation has increased and blossomed far beyond all levels of expectation.

The Armenian government is no more enthusiastic in maintaining open borders with Iran, as Iran is with Armenia.⁵¹ Both countries continue to reap the benefits of the current situation to enhance their own national agendas with an accepted level of risk. While Armenians risk passing Azeri militants from Iran into its borders, Iran risks infiltration by Western intelligence officers into its territories through Armenia. The diplomatic connivance by both countries will continue until the political and economic interests yield to cultural, religious, and national polarization.

United States: Out of the Game?

The U.S. strategy in dealing with the Caucasus, specifically with the Nagorno-Karabagh, was initially unfocused. The United States was lethargic in dealing with the conflict and allowed Russia to dominate the stage, an opportunity Russia has enthusiastically seized.⁵² The U.S. has a seat in the Minsk group, but such a position has

⁵⁰ Heydarian, “Iran-Turkey-Syria: An Alliance of Convenience.”

⁵¹ Cornell, 394.

⁵² Ibid., 368.

not increased U.S. relevance in the region. Quite the contrary, it has diminished U.S. prestige, causing great despair for Armenia and a level of confusion for Azerbaijan.⁵³

The U.S. primary interest in the South Caucasus is access to oil, freedom of action and strategic maneuver from east to west.⁵⁴ A secondary U.S. interest is to challenge the potential of Russian and Iranian hegemonic control in the Caucasus.⁵⁵ Strategic alliances of the United States however, have been challenged by the Russian-Iranian influence over Azerbaijan, Armenia, and now Turkey. U.S. political and military leaders have realized that threatening Turkey is a strategic mistake that can have devastating strategic effects, resulting in the loss of military basing, energy resources, and a strong Muslim ally. Turkey's rise as a powerful nation in the region has inspired Turkish political leaders to seek out a greater role in world order with a vision that often outflanks the U.S.-Turkish partnership. Over time, the Turkish people have become cynical over the U.S. presence in the region and see the U.S. as an external agitator. "The American's no matter what they say, cannot get used to a new world where regional powers want to have a say in regional and global politics This is our neighborhood, and we don't want trouble. The Americans create havoc, and we are left holding the bag."⁵⁶

As the U.S. draws down its military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the central powers on the continent are left to deal with the realities of the new regional order. Russia and Iran have strategically minimized the U.S. influence in the Caucasus by hindering the normalization of the Turkish-Armenian relationship and by debilitating the

⁵³ Cornell, 371.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 388.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 388-389.

⁵⁶ Tavernise and Slackman, "Turkey Goes From Pliable Ally to Thorn for U.S."

mediation process of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.⁵⁷ Russia and Iran have warned Azerbaijan and Georgia that introduction of NATO forces or military bases in either country is unacceptable. Armenia is dependent on Iranian and Russian energy resources. For Russia, Turkish-Armenian normalization is another NATO step towards the underbelly of the Russian Federation. Loss of Armenia to NATO can lead to loss of Georgia and eventually Azerbaijan to the Western sphere of influence. For Iran, normalized relations between Turkey and Armenia will have both economic and security ramifications. Armenia is dependent on Iranian exports for consumer goods as well as energy resources so normalization with Turkey will disrupt Iranian markets.⁵⁸

For Russia, however, if normalized Turkish-Armenian relations are at the expense of the Turkish-Azeri relations this may strengthen Russo-Azeri cooperation which is one of Russia's primary regional agendas. Russian and Turkish interests are at odds in relation to Azeri oil. Resolving the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations while supporting the Turkish-Azeri kinship will help the United States gain greater influence over Armenia and weaken Russia's stronghold. Such a pursuit may require US military involvement in Nagorno-Karabagh with the commitment and will to confront Russia and Iran. Barring a strong U.S. diplomatic and if necessary, military involvement, the legitimacy of the United States as an influential player in the Caucasus region may continue to diminish.

⁵⁷ Gareth Chappell, *Turkey, Russia and Iran: Common Interests, Common Positions?* Center for International Relations, Reports and Analyses, July 2010
http://csm.org.pl/fileadmin/files/Biblioteka_CSM/Raporty_i_analizy/2010/Reports%20and%20Analyses_Turkey_Russia_Iran.pdf, (accessed May 21, 2011), 12.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

Conflicting and Competing Issues

Today Russia, Iran, and Turkey manipulate politics and the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict to effectively counterbalance and strengthen their strategic positions over the Caucasian region. Russia is on a quest to make Turkey and Iran economically dependent on itself, Turkey is attempting to use its relationship with Russia to secure its aim at creating a Ceyhan oil hub, while Iran is using Russia to counter Turkey's domination in the region by denying a foothold for the Western nations.⁵⁹ As each regional power competes over finite resources within the Caucasus region, the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict spirals downward as the warring parties continue to arm themselves with sophisticated military technology which can undoubtedly lead to war.⁶⁰ Turkey, Iran, and Russia indisputably believe that their own military aptitude is supreme compared the other.⁶¹ As Turkey dwindles away from United States sphere of influence and continues to build its relationship with Russia and Iran, the strategic position of the United States in Turkey will weaken. War in the Caucasus will open a window of opportunities which will prove irresistible for regional powers to ignore especially if a military venture may result in expanding regional dominance and acquiring a significant share of resources.⁶² The following chapter will focus on recommendations and thoughts to help untangle the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, but more importantly for the United States and western

⁵⁹ Heydarian, "Iran-Turkey-Syria: An Alliance of Convenience."

⁶⁰ Bertsch et al., 172, 180.

⁶¹ Cornell, 139.

⁶² Bertsch et al., 187.

nations, it will address ways to regain both legitimacy and the strategic advantage in the Caucasus region.

CHAPTER 5 NEW MINSK CO-CHAIRS

Worst Case Scenario: Potential Azeri Attack

If in 2007, Georgia was able to double its defense spending to \$575 million overnight and build its military forces by claiming that it was simply professionalizing its military, and then in 2008 begin a military incursion into South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a similar scenario exists in the Caucasus today.¹ Azeri and Armenian rhetoric indicating a clear intent to resolve the conflict by force, coupled with the increased defense spending in both countries is certainly a similar dangerous brew that can lead to war. Unlike Georgia, an open war over Nagorno-Karabagh would likely bring two major regional military powers into a conflict, with one as a NATO partner. An added danger is Russian forces are based in Armenia. An attack by Azerbaijan may cause Russia to counter with force. Azerbaijan continues to threaten use of force to recapture Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia. Supported by arsenals of modern weapons the next conflict will have enormous human casualties on both sides.

The recent diplomatic efforts by the OSCE to raise the international awareness of the rising tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh have been overshadowed by the turmoil and mass revolts in the Middle East.² The world's attention diverted towards the Middle East, Azerbaijan could use this as an opportunity to launch a military offensive to quickly

¹ De Waal, *The Caucasus*, 207.

² International Crisis Group, *Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War*, Policy Briefing N-60, February 8, 2011
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/caucasus/B60%20Armenia%20and%20Azerbaijan%20---%20Preventing%20War.ashx> (accessed May 22, 2011), 5.

capture Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Armenian controlled territories. Resumption of hostilities will not only upset the regional stability but “would seriously undermine U.S. and EU energy interests . . . and threaten the Caucasus air corridor that accounts for nearly 70 percent of all NATO’s military transport flights to bases in Central Asia, as well as the alternative overland supply route to Afghanistan via Azerbaijan.”³ Russia would stand to lose its prestige and legitimacy as the security guarantor of any of its Near Abroad countries. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War proved that Russia will resort to military force to protect its interests in the Caucasus, even if there is a risk of military confrontation with regional and global powers. The fact that the United States was Georgia’s primary ally did not deter Russia from a full scale attack on Georgia’s sovereignty, proves the limitations of these alliances. The failed Georgian military offensive against South Ossetia escalated into a major combat operation when Russia intervened at a time when most people were preoccupied with the Olympic Games held in China. An Azeri offensive supported by Turkey would surely be considered by Russian politicians as a NATO threat to an area considered vital to Russia’s national security interests. An all out war may ensue involving Russia and Turkey and could ultimately bring in the United States and Iran.

During the Nagorno-Karabagh war from 1988 to 1994, the regional powers lured the conflicting parties into their area of influence by offering financial and military support.⁴ Since the 1994 ceasefire, the competition between Russia, Turkey, United States, and Iran has shifted from the battlefield of Nagorno-Karabagh to the political

³ International Crisis Group, 16.

⁴ Cornell, 139.

domain of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and continues within the framework of the Minsk Group.⁵ Although the OSCE is the only organization that has provided the common mediating platform for all parties involved, the failed diplomatic process of the Minsk Group to achieve a breakthrough in the negotiation process only heightens the potential for renewed conflict.⁶ It is imperative to resolve this conflict within OSCE and prevent it from returning back to the battlefields of Nagorno-Karabagh, with potentially disastrous consequences.

There are two recommendations that, if implemented by the OSCE Minsk Group, can change the stalled negotiations related to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. First, the Minsk Group co-chairs must be replaced with nations that can remain unbiased and that have interests linked to stability in the Caucasus region. Second, the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict must be interlinked with the recognition by both Azerbaijan and Turkey of the Armenian genocide. Recognizing the genocide will drastically change Armenians' historic fears of annihilation by their neighbors and open prospects for a lasting peace in the Caucasus. It is in implementing these recommendations that the U.S. involvement can help reclaim its legitimacy as a peace maker, while also regaining strategic leverage in the region.

⁵ Bertsch et al., 147-148.

⁶ Ibid., 145.

First Recommendation

Minsk Group: Same Structure, but Neutral Players

The OSCE Minsk Group must transition into an organization that is able to make impartial decisions outside of national interests of the current co-chairs, United States, France, and Russia, who have been unable to maintain their neutrality in dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and therefore must abdicate their positions. This is not to say that Russia, France, and the U.S. must be completely removed from the negotiation process. The current co-chair nations have a tremendous amount of influence on the leadership of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, which can be leveraged to achieve the Minsk Group's desired goals. However Russia, France, and the United States can perform monitoring responsibilities and be the primary force providers for the peace keeping missions in the conflict zone at the direction of another group of co-chairs. In order to inspire a Russian, French, and U.S. active involvement, the introduction of transitioning co-chairs into the strategic environment as mediators must not threaten the interests of the existing players. The transitioning Minsk Group must adhere to a threefold rigid standard.

First, the new co-chairs must be geographically absent from the Caucasus region and demonstrate a political neutrality regarding any Armenian or Azeri diasporas within their countries. Such a mandate would effectively eliminate Armenian and Azeri lobbying groups from exerting undue political pressure on the new co-chairs. It is clear that in Russia, the United States, and France the Armenian and Azeri populations influenced and therefore hindered the Minsk Group's decision making process.⁷

⁷ Cornell, 378.

Second, the elected countries to serve as new co-chair the Minsk Group must have adequate motivation for achieving regional stability. A peaceful resolution must have promote stability. The current co-chairs seek strategic advancement by taking advantage of the instability in the region; therefore, a nation that has a limited stake in the region, and perhaps even benefit from ending conflict would be best suited to seek solutions to Nagorno-Karabakh's status.

Third, the new co-chairs must be chosen from a list of nations that have the respect of Azerbaijani political leaders as well as the key regional players, Russia and Turkey. Such a combination may seem unrealistic, but is required if a permanent solution is to be achieved.

Global Economic Disruption

In an attempt to identify nations with significant economic links to the region a search was conducted in the European Commission on Trade which provides statistical data on trade relations between the EU and the rest of the world. An analysis of the 2009 economic indicators published by the European Trade commission helped narrow down the top fifteen trade partners for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and the United States.⁸ From a potential 23 nations, the list of countries was considerably refined to a total of six nations by means of applying the following criteria: economic condition of the country, religious makeup and affiliation, trade balances with Armenia,

⁸ European Trade Commission, ec.europa.eu, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/> (accessed June 7, 2011). Listed in Appendix I-O is trade statistics from the European Trade Commission for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, Turkey, the United States, and the European Union. The U.S. and the E.U. persistently remained within the top fifteen trading nations, however, since the purpose of sifting through the data was to identify co-chair nations other than, Russia, United States, Iran, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, these nations were manually removed from the data.

Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, the ability and experience of the nation to assume leadership, and finally the financial impact to the co-chair nation relative to disruption in the Caucasus. The results revealed an economic link between the Caucasus region and six powerful nations: China, India, Japan, Canada, Brazil, and Switzerland.⁹ These nations collectively amounted to trade capital reaching a total of 106.17 billion Euros in 2009 alone.¹⁰

These new Minsk Group co-chairs could bring a new perspective and a fresh outlook on how to resolve the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, while United States, Russia, France and potentially Turkey and Iran carry out the peacekeeping and monitoring mission on the ground. This is a decision that is overdue. As an observer noted, “OSCE has never managed to establish a peacekeeping mission in the conflict zone After 16 years of the OSCE’s involvement in the peace process, it may be high time to discuss the progress of this forum.”¹¹ This approach also commits the key nations with direct interest in the region to begin a dialogue on the specifics and number of troops each nation will provide to help guarantee the stability of the region. To bring a lasting solution to this historic conflict however Minsk Group must address the underlining issues.

Minsk Groups efforts have failed to account for historic factors like the Armenian genocide, which has deep roots extending into the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Addressing the single most significant historical event that has shaped the collective memory and identity of the Armenian people for generations can drastically change the

⁹ See Appendix P, Q and R indicating elimination process for the top six nations as co-chair possibilities.

¹⁰ The statistics also highlighted that the United States and the European Union combined, traded with Turkey, Russia, Iran, Armenia, and Azerbaijan totaling 274.966 billion Euros.

¹¹ Mikhalidze, 4.

course of the conflict. At the same time normalizing the Turkish-Armenian relations will open the borders of Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. The United States can take a leading role in forging peaceful relations between Azerbaijan, Turkey and Armenia.

Military assessments rank Armenia as the potential victor in a renewed Armenian Azeri war. This is primarily due to Armenia's well trained and highly skilled military cadre.¹² However, shifting demographics will undoubtedly weaken the military competitiveness. The Armenian-Azeri war over Nagorno-Karabakh drastically offset the gender ratio of Armenia.¹³ Culturally endogenic, and with an already a low fertility rate of 1.3 child per woman in a lifetime, Armenia's future as a nation is bleak.¹⁴ Barring normalization of the Armenian-Azeri and Armenian-Turkish relations, the declining demography of Armenia may force its political leaders in the future to acquiesce into the Russian Federation. Russia already has solidified its control over Armenia and has established its military bases firmly in the region.¹⁵ Drastic measures are needed to compromise Armenia and Russia union. Great measures are also needed to restrain Azerbaijan from making a strategic mistake by waging war.

¹² International Crisis Group, *Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War*, Policy Briefing N-60, February 8, 2011
[http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/caucasus/B60%20Armenia%20and%20Azerbaijan%20---%20Preventing%20War.ashx](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/B60%20Armenia%20and%20Azerbaijan%20---%20Preventing%20War.ashx) (accessed May 22, 2011), 14.

¹³ Paul Goble, "Demography and Foreign Policy in South Caucasus," *Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy*, Volume III No. 6, March 15, 2010
http://ada.edu.az/bwprint.php?item_id=20100315074511048&sec_id=324 (accessed May 27, 2011)

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Mikhalidze, 6.

Second Recommendation

Interlink Genocide and Nagorno-Karabagh resolution

The recommendation is to tie the recognition of the Armenian genocide into the Nagorno-Karabakh resolution. Since the lack of trust between the two communities stemmed from the association of Azeris to the Ottoman Turks and the genocide, an official recognition by the Azerbaijani leadership of the genocide will not only bolster the Armenian and Azerbaijani relations but simultaneously pacify the fears of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Critics may argue that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has no connection to the genocide issue, but in fact, and quite the contrary, the reluctance of the Armenians to allow Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh has been based over concerns for the security of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Moreover, the reason for the failed 2008 normalization attempt of the Armenian Turkish relations was due to Turkey's preconditions of relating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with the Armenian-Turkish border.¹⁶

The fact remains that both Turkey and Armenia have approached the genocide issue from a confrontational standpoint. Turkey continues to deny the genocide, which only amplifies Armenia's sentiment that Turkey could sometime in the future repeat the same atrocities. United States can play a significant role by hosting Armenian and Turkish political discussion to identify Armenia's claims, if or when Turkey accepts the massacres of 1915 as genocide, especially when the 2015 centennial of the event is in the horizon. Author Thomas De Waal, a noted expert on the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict,

¹⁶ Mikhalidze, 7.

offers a possible approach. “If in his comments on this issue, President Obama makes reference to the centennial and encourages Turkey to be ready to take part in the commemoration rather than isolate itself from it, he could aspire to be a catalyst for Armenian-Turkish reconciliation, rather than another actor in the long-running quarrel between the two peoples.”¹⁷ In fact Armenia and Turkey have never discussed the financial compensation Armenia requires Turkey to repay or territory that Armenia would receive. As it stands today, Armenia is unable to successfully manage its own territories let alone acquire added titles. The cost of monetary compensation for genocide victims may be far less than the loss of life and resources, which will cost nations if the war in Nagorno-Karabakh resumes and causes grave economic and social disruption. Only by encouraging an open dialogue, without preconditions, that allows Turkey and Armenia to reach a common agreement on the issue of the Armenian genocide will both countries be able to shift from the current defensive posture and come to terms with the past. Such measures will require not only the OSCE Minsk Groups involvement but also the involvement, of the populations of Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

The United States has an opportunity to help bring these communities together by tackling the questions that have previously been avoided. Focusing on Truth-telling and reconciliation, as demonstrated by South Africa, will help Caucasian countries focus on the core historical issues that shape identity and memory. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was a court-like body in Cape-Town, established in 1995, as a socio-political process to expose human rights abuses carried out by the apartheid regime, allowing victims to testify in public or private hearings which served a

¹⁷ De Waal, *Armenia and Turkey*, 7.

therapeutic function.¹⁸ This allowed victims to forgive the perpetrators but more importantly allowed the perpetrators to publicly renounce their crimes helping both victim and perpetrator alike to move past the negative historic memories. TRC like model can be used to begin reconciliation and truth commissions between Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan to address the genocide of 1915 and similar historic events that hold these nations hostage to enmity and collective memories of injustice. Only by embracing an open reconciliation process between Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, can the United States reclaim its influence and earn authority, by building legitimacy. Influence in the Caucasus is kindled not by force, but by invitation.

¹⁸ Debra Kaminer, "The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: relation to psychiatric status and forgiveness among survivors of human rights abuses," *The British Journal of Psychiatry* (2001) 178: 373-377, <http://bjp.rcpsych.org/cgi/content/full/178/4/373> (accessed June 7, 2011)

CONCLUSION

The aim of this paper has been to examine the inevitability of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and illustrate how renewed fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan will threaten the geo-economic and political interests of Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the United States and possibly envelop two or more of them in war. The fact that both Armenia and Azerbaijan consider Nagorno-Karabakh strategically invaluable and an intricate part of their nationhood indicates the difficulty of resolving the conflict. Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the United States, all at different points in time, have taken positions as mediators, pretending to be neutral in their decision making process. One of the primary interests which all dominant players have in common is tied with the Caspian Oil reserves in Azerbaijan.

The Minsk Group within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, co-chaired by Russia, America, and France is tasked to help mediate the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. However, each co-chair nation approaches this conflict with its own national interests in mind, naturally clashing with one another over the same issues: regional control, freedom of access, and energy resources. The Minsk Group efforts have failed to address the underlying issues of religion, language, ethnic lineage, nationality, identity, collective memories and fears of extermination. To help bolster the Minsk Group's ability to become an effective mediating body, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group must be replaced by candidates that can remain neutral and unbiased. China, India, Japan, Brazil, Canada, and Switzerland are the select few nations that could fill the Minsk Group co-chair positions. The economic trade interests of these nations rely heavily on

the stability of the region thus motivating them to find enduring solutions. The Russian, French, and U.S. role in the region must be limited to monitoring and providing peace keeping forces upon recommendation of Minsk Group co-chairs.

Resolving the conflict is actually against Russian and Iranian interests. Russia has used the conflict to maintain Russian military bases in Armenia, while Iran has used the conflict to maintain control over its twenty five million Azeri population. Controlling the status-quo of the conflict has allowed Russia and Iran to minimize the U.S. and Turkish influence in the region. The belligerents themselves have managed to maintain the frozen status of the conflict without the presence of international monitors or peace keepers. Technically still at war, sniper attacks and occasional skirmishes have resulted in military casualties from both Armenian and Azerbaijani forces.

Supported by its ally Turkey, and largely funded by the Caspian oil revenues, Azerbaijan has dwarfed Armenian defense spending. Armenians have aligned themselves with Russia, which has guaranteed military supplies and support in case of an Azerbaijani offensive. The Azeri political leadership has threatened to take back the Azeri lands including Nagorno-Karabakh through military force. Armenian political leaders have answered with similar rhetoric. Since the 1994, Russian brokered, ceasefire agreement, both Azerbaijan and Armenia have been frustrated with the lack of diplomatic progress to resolve the conflict. Trust between the two former Soviet neighboring countries has completely diminished. Armenia and Azerbaijan are once again on a path of collision.

As Armenian and Azerbaijani politicians continue to build their arsenals and threaten each other with extreme war rhetoric, the regional powers continue to manipulate the status-quo of the conflict for their own national interests. Thus, the fragile

ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabagh teeters on the decision of the strategic corporal waiting in the trenches for the next skirmish, whose mistaken action in Nagorno-Karabagh may drag the regional powers into an unexpected and accidental military confrontation.

History seems to be repeating itself for the Armenian people. From the beginning of the 19th century, having lost all of western Armenia¹ to Turkey and suffering 1.5 million victims to the Turkish genocide, Armenia was left to defend its remaining ancestral lands in Nagorno-Karabakh against the Turkish and the newly-formed Azerbaijani nation in 1918. The Turkish government's refusal to recognize the 1915 killings as genocide has highlighted fears that Turkey has not changed and is still a viable threat to Armenia's existence. Although it has been twenty years since the fall of the Iron Curtain, part of it remains intact separating Armenia and Turkey.

For Armenians, the 1915 killings have become an intrinsic part of every individual's psyche. Armenians have mentally compared the inter-communal massacres of the Ottoman killings to every conflict which has occurred with Azerbaijan. Armenians immediately relate the genocide of 1915 to the pogroms which took place in Azerbaijani cities of Baku and Sumgait in February of 1988. The Turkish-Azeri alliance since 1991 basically strengthened the Armenian perception that Turkey is still on a quest to unify the southern Caucasus at the expense of Armenia.

The United States is currently in a position to bring about three essential changes to help settle the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. First, it must help re-organize the Minsk Group co-chairmanship with neutral parties that can approach this conflict with a fresh look and with an aim to achieve stability over the status-quo. Second, the U.S. must be

¹ Present day eastern Turkey

able to convince the Turkish, Armenian, and Azeri political leadership that a conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh will only strengthen Russia's and Iran's stranglehold over the region. An unconventional approach must be taken to begin a dialogue and increase the level of trust between the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations. By recognizing the genocide and officially requesting that Turkey do the same, Azerbaijan can quickly reverse the course of this conflict and swiftly reassure the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabagh. Third, United States must sponsor discussions between Turkey and Armenia that are focused on acknowledging the claims of genocide. Such a radical approach is essential to settle historical differences and establish a platform of trust in the Caucasus and reinstate United States legitimacy and role in the region as a peace maker and peace keeper, while also stabilizing the region and preventing a potentially catastrophic conflict. "The Caucasus is a vital link between Asia and Europe and between East and WestWhat happens here has implications for the region and the world."²

² Bertsch et al., 140.

APPENDIX A

AREA MAP



Source: Maps of Caucasus and Central Asia,

<http://fs.huntingdon.edu/jlewis/syl/ircomp/MapsCaucasus.htm#Closer> (accessed March

21, 2011)

APPENDIX B
HISTORICAL MAP OF ARMENIA



Source: Armenia Yesterday and Today,

<http://www.richardsmith.net/armenia/sako.html> (accessed March 21, 2011)

APPENDIX C

ARMENIAN ALPHABET

| | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|-----------|-------------|----------------|-------------|------------------|--------------|------------|------------------|
| Աա | Բբ | Գգ | Դդ | Եե | Զզ | Էէ | Ըը | Թթ |
| A father | B big | G god | D dog | Ye yet | Z zebra | E end | U but | T tee |
| Ժժ | Իի | Լլ | Խխ | Օօ | Կկ | Հհ | ՉՉ | Ղղ |
| Zh measure | I meet | L Lilly | Kh guttural | Ts Mitzi | K Micky | H hello | Dz kids | Gh guttural x |
| Ծծ | Մմ | Իյ | Նն | Շշ | Վօ or Օ | Չհ | Պպ | Ջջ |
| Dj hard 'j' | M mom | Y year | N number | Sh show | Vo or O vocal | Ch church | P pizza | J jeans |
| Րր | Սս | Վվ | Տտ | Րր | Յյ | Ոո | Փփ | Քք |
| R rolled | S sand | V Victor | T but | R red | Ts bits | U cool | P pen | Q queen |
| Լլ | Օօ | Ֆֆ | | | | | | |
| yev | O done | F life | | | | | | |

Source: Embassy of the Republic of Armenia in London,

<http://www.armenianembassy.org.uk/culture.htm>

APPENDIX D

MAP OF PERSIAN KHANATES




Source: Kodoom.com, Persian Information hub,

http://ref.kodoom.com/en/Khanates_of_the_Caucasus (accessed March 21, 2011)

APPENDIX E

MAP OF ETHNIC ARMENIAN CLEANSING



Source: Armenian Diaspora, <http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/news/1219-why-the-armenian-genocide-matters.html> (accessed March 21, 2011)

APPENDIX F

MAP OF ETHNIC MAKE-UP OF THE CAUCASUS




Source: Youth Atlantic Treaty Association, <http://yata->

network.blogspot.com/2009_01_01_archive.html (accessed March 22, 2011)

APPENDIX G

MAP OF NAGORNO-KARABAGH



Source: European Dialogue, Nagorno-Karabakh Map

<http://eurodialogue.org/Nagorno-Karabakh-Map> (accessed June 7, 2011)

APPENDIX H

MAP OF NAGORNO-KARABAGH AND ARMENIAN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES



Source: Nonformality.org, Conflicts in Europe <http://www.nonformality.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/12/120-large.jpg> (accessed June 7, 2011)

APPENDIX I

ARMENIA 2009 TRADE PARTNERS

| ARMENIA'S TRADE WITH MAIN PARTNERS (2009) | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----------------------|----------|--------|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------|--------|--------------------------|-----------------------|----------|--------|
| The Major Imports Partners | | | | The Major Export Partners | | | | The Major Trade Partners | | | |
| Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % |
| | World (all countries) | 2.349,2 | 100,0% | | World (all countries) | 496,7 | 100,0% | | World (all countries) | 2.845,9 | 100,0% |
| 1 | EU27 | 643,0 | 27,4% | 1 | EU27 | 221,3 | 44,6% | 1 | EU27 | 864,3 | 30,4% |
| 2 | Russia | 567,3 | 24,2% | 2 | Russia | 76,7 | 15,4% | 2 | Russia | 644,0 | 22,6% |
| 3 | China | 205,3 | 8,7% | 3 | United States | 48,1 | 9,7% | 3 | China | 217,8 | 7,7% |
| 4 | Ukraine | 144,4 | 6,1% | 4 | Georgia | 38,1 | 7,7% | 4 | Ukraine | 153,4 | 5,4% |
| 5 | Turkey | 126,5 | 5,4% | 5 | Canada | 24,5 | 4,9% | 5 | United States | 135,0 | 4,7% |
| 6 | Iran | 95,6 | 4,1% | 6 | Switzerland | 17,3 | 3,5% | 6 | Turkey | 127,3 | 4,5% |
| 7 | United States | 86,9 | 3,7% | 7 | Iran | 13,4 | 2,7% | 7 | Iran | 109,0 | 3,8% |
| 8 | Switzerland | 84,6 | 3,6% | 8 | China | 12,6 | 2,5% | 8 | Switzerland | 101,9 | 3,6% |
| 9 | South Korea | 63,9 | 2,7% | 9 | Ukraine | 9,0 | 1,8% | 9 | South Korea | 68,4 | 2,4% |
| 10 | Japan | 55,0 | 2,3% | 10 | South Korea | 4,5 | 0,9% | 10 | Georgia | 67,4 | 2,4% |
| 11 | Brazil | 39,4 | 1,7% | 11 | United Arab Emirat | 3,9 | 0,8% | 11 | Japan | 55,2 | 1,9% |
| 12 | India | 31,0 | 1,3% | 12 | Belarus | 3,3 | 0,7% | 12 | Brazil | 39,4 | 1,4% |
| 13 | Georgia | 29,3 | 1,2% | 13 | Thailand | 2,6 | 0,5% | 13 | Canada | 37,6 | 1,3% |
| 14 | United Arab Emirat | 21,7 | 0,9% | 14 | Turkmenistan | 2,1 | 0,4% | 14 | India | 33,0 | 1,2% |
| 15 | Indonesia | 18,5 | 0,8% | 15 | India | 2,0 | 0,4% | 15 | United Arab Emirat | 25,6 | 0,9% |
| 16 | Belarus | 17,6 | 0,7% | 16 | Kazakhstan | 1,7 | 0,3% | 16 | Belarus | 20,9 | 0,7% |
| 17 | Canada | 13,1 | 0,6% | 17 | Panama | 1,3 | 0,3% | 17 | Indonesia | 18,5 | 0,6% |
| 18 | Thailand | 10,7 | 0,5% | 18 | Uzbekistan | 1,2 | 0,2% | 18 | Thailand | 13,4 | 0,5% |
| 19 | Turkmenistan | 10,0 | 0,4% | 19 | Moldova | 0,9 | 0,2% | 19 | Turkmenistan | 12,1 | 0,4% |
| 20 | Ecuador | 8,0 | 0,3% | 20 | Turkey | 0,9 | 0,2% | 20 | Ecuador | 8,1 | 0,3% |
| 21 | Malaysia | 7,8 | 0,3% | 21 | Colombia | 0,6 | 0,1% | 21 | Israel | 7,0 | 0,2% |

Source: European Trade Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/> (accessed June 7, 2011)

APPENDIX J

AZERBAIJAN 2009 TRADE PARTNERS

| AZERBAIJAN'S TRADE WITH MAIN PARTNERS (2009) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------|----------|--------|---------------------------|---------------------|----------|--------|--------------------------|---------------------|----------|--------|--|
| The Major Imports Partners | | | | The Major Export Partners | | | | The Major Trade Partners | | | | |
| Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | |
| | World (all countrie | 4.380,4 | 100,0% | | World (all countrie | 9.984,5 | 100,0% | | World (all countrie | 14.364,9 | 100,0% | |
| 1 | EU27 | 1.172,3 | 26,8% | 1 | EU27 | 4.541,9 | 45,5% | 1 | EU27 | 5.714,2 | 39,8% | |
| 2 | Russia | 767,8 | 17,5% | 2 | United States | 1.234,8 | 12,4% | 2 | United States | 1.427,9 | 9,9% | |
| 3 | Turkey | 648,8 | 14,8% | 3 | Israel | 916,2 | 9,2% | 3 | Russia | 1.297,8 | 9,0% | |
| 4 | Ukraine | 367,1 | 8,4% | 4 | Russia | 530,0 | 5,3% | 4 | Israel | 973,4 | 6,8% | |
| 5 | China | 347,1 | 7,9% | 5 | Indonesia | 470,0 | 4,7% | 5 | Turkey | 726,2 | 5,1% | |
| 6 | United States | 193,1 | 4,4% | 6 | Canada | 421,9 | 4,2% | 6 | Ukraine | 492,2 | 3,4% | |
| 7 | Japan | 104,1 | 2,4% | 7 | Georgia | 281,0 | 2,8% | 7 | Indonesia | 472,7 | 3,3% | |
| 8 | Belarus | 98,0 | 2,2% | 8 | Malaysia | 271,6 | 2,7% | 8 | China | 439,0 | 3,1% | |
| 9 | South Korea | 89,5 | 2,0% | 9 | India | 205,2 | 2,1% | 9 | Canada | 428,4 | 3,0% | |
| 10 | Brazil | 80,6 | 1,8% | 10 | Croatia | 132,1 | 1,3% | 10 | Georgia | 323,9 | 2,3% | |
| 11 | Switzerland | 65,3 | 1,5% | 11 | Ukraine | 125,1 | 1,3% | 11 | Malaysia | 301,7 | 2,1% | |
| 12 | Israel | 57,2 | 1,3% | 12 | South Korea | 105,4 | 1,1% | 12 | India | 244,5 | 1,7% | |
| 13 | Iran | 56,4 | 1,3% | 13 | Kazakhstan | 101,1 | 1,0% | 13 | South Korea | 194,9 | 1,4% | |
| 14 | Kazakhstan | 45,6 | 1,0% | 14 | China | 91,9 | 0,9% | 14 | Kazakhstan | 146,7 | 1,0% | |
| 15 | Georgia | 42,9 | 1,0% | 15 | Libya | 91,5 | 0,9% | 15 | Croatia | 132,6 | 0,9% | |
| 16 | India | 39,3 | 0,9% | 16 | Turkey | 77,5 | 0,8% | 16 | Iran | 120,4 | 0,8% | |
| 17 | Malaysia | 30,1 | 0,7% | 17 | Iran | 64,1 | 0,6% | 17 | Japan | 104,1 | 0,7% | |
| 18 | United Arab Emirat | 23,0 | 0,5% | 18 | Afghanistan | 41,0 | 0,4% | 18 | Belarus | 101,6 | 0,7% | |
| 19 | South Africa | 19,8 | 0,5% | 19 | Morocco | 35,1 | 0,4% | 19 | Libya | 91,5 | 0,6% | |
| 20 | Turkmenistan | 18,7 | 0,4% | 20 | Iraq | 33,6 | 0,3% | 20 | Brazil | 80,6 | 0,6% | |
| 21 | Argentina | 14,2 | 0,3% | 21 | Turkmenistan | 26,7 | 0,3% | 21 | Switzerland | 74,5 | 0,5% | |

Source: European Trade Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating->

[opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/](http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/) (accessed June 7, 2011)

APPENDIX K

IRAN 2009 TRADE PARTNERS

| IRAN'S TRADE WITH MAIN PARTNERS (2009) | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------|----------|--------|---------------------------|---------------------|----------|--------|--------------------------|---------------------|----------|--------|
| The Major Imports Partners | | | | The Major Export Partners | | | | The Major Trade Partners | | | |
| Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % |
| | World (all countrie | 42.455,2 | 100,0% | | World (all countrie | 51.380,6 | 100,0% | | World (all countrie | 93.835,7 | 100,0% |
| 1 | EU27 | 11.462,9 | 27,0% | 1 | China | 8.617,2 | 16,8% | 1 | EU27 | 19.128,7 | 20,4% |
| 2 | United Arab Emirat | 6.457,0 | 15,2% | 2 | EU27 | 7.665,7 | 14,9% | 2 | China | 14.840,7 | 15,8% |
| 3 | China | 6.223,5 | 14,7% | 3 | India | 6.866,1 | 13,4% | 3 | India | 8.421,4 | 9,0% |
| 4 | South Korea | 3.142,3 | 7,4% | 4 | Japan | 6.036,5 | 11,7% | 4 | Japan | 7.335,7 | 7,8% |
| 5 | Russia | 2.180,7 | 5,1% | 5 | South Korea | 3.739,3 | 7,3% | 5 | United Arab Emirat | 6.935,4 | 7,4% |
| 6 | Turkey | 1.595,7 | 3,8% | 6 | Turkey | 2.208,3 | 4,3% | 6 | South Korea | 6.881,6 | 7,3% |
| 7 | India | 1.555,4 | 3,7% | 7 | South Africa | 1.893,2 | 3,7% | 7 | Turkey | 3.804,0 | 4,1% |
| 8 | Japan | 1.299,2 | 3,1% | 8 | Singapore | 919,8 | 1,8% | 8 | Russia | 2.319,2 | 2,5% |
| 9 | Brazil | 922,4 | 2,2% | 9 | Pakistan | 626,3 | 1,2% | 9 | South Africa | 1.991,8 | 2,1% |
| 10 | Argentina | 675,2 | 1,6% | 10 | Syria | 535,2 | 1,0% | 10 | Singapore | 1.361,9 | 1,5% |
| 11 | Thailand | 661,7 | 1,6% | 11 | Sri Lanka | 503,0 | 1,0% | 11 | Brazil | 936,5 | 1,0% |
| 12 | Ukraine | 592,5 | 1,4% | 12 | Morocco | 478,7 | 0,9% | 12 | Thailand | 828,8 | 0,9% |
| 13 | Switzerland | 552,4 | 1,3% | 13 | United Arab Emirat | 478,4 | 0,9% | 13 | Pakistan | 828,0 | 0,9% |
| 14 | Malaysia | 536,0 | 1,3% | 14 | Saudi Arabia | 399,6 | 0,8% | 14 | Malaysia | 745,3 | 0,8% |
| 15 | Singapore | 442,1 | 1,0% | 15 | Indonesia | 231,4 | 0,5% | 15 | Saudi Arabia | 700,3 | 0,7% |
| 16 | Indonesia | 398,5 | 0,9% | 16 | Malaysia | 209,3 | 0,4% | 16 | Argentina | 680,8 | 0,7% |
| 17 | Australia | 347,7 | 0,8% | 17 | Thailand | 167,1 | 0,3% | 17 | Indonesia | 629,9 | 0,7% |
| 18 | Saudi Arabia | 300,7 | 0,7% | 18 | Russia | 138,5 | 0,3% | 18 | Ukraine | 614,0 | 0,7% |
| 19 | Canada | 282,7 | 0,7% | 19 | Turkmenistan | 117,2 | 0,2% | 19 | Switzerland | 579,3 | 0,6% |
| 20 | Oman | 248,2 | 0,6% | 20 | Hong Kong | 100,4 | 0,2% | 20 | Syria | 544,2 | 0,6% |
| 21 | United States | 222,2 | 0,5% | 21 | Armenia | 86,0 | 0,2% | 21 | Cri Lanka | 524,5 | 0,6% |

Source: European Trade Commission, [http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-](http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/)

[opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/](http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/) (accessed June 7, 2011)

APPENDIX L

RUSSIA 2009 TRADE PARTNERS

| RUSSIA'S TRADE WITH MAIN PARTNERS (2009) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------|-----------|--------|---------------------------|-----------------|-----------|--------|--------------------------|---------------|-----------|--------|--|
| The Major Imports Partners | | | | The Major Export Partners | | | | The Major Trade Partners | | | | |
| Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | |
| World (all countries) | | 113.817,9 | 100,0% | World (all countries) | | 202.240,8 | 100,0% | World (all countries) | | 316.058,7 | 100,0% | |
| 1 | EU27 | 51.850,4 | 45,6% | 1 | EU27 | 93.278,4 | 46,1% | 1 | EU27 | 145.128,7 | 45,9% | |
| 2 | China | 16.289,5 | 14,3% | 2 | China | 11.500,3 | 5,7% | 2 | China | 27.789,8 | 8,8% | |
| 3 | Ukraine | 6.390,3 | 5,6% | 3 | Turkey | 7.290,2 | 3,6% | 3 | Ukraine | 13.352,8 | 4,2% | |
| 4 | United States | 6.156,8 | 5,4% | 4 | Ukraine | 6.962,5 | 3,4% | 4 | United States | 11.588,1 | 3,7% | |
| 5 | Japan | 5.206,3 | 4,6% | 5 | Kazakhstan | 6.280,4 | 3,1% | 5 | Japan | 10.221,9 | 3,2% | |
| 6 | South Korea | 3.471,8 | 3,1% | 6 | United States | 5.431,3 | 2,7% | 6 | Turkey | 9.595,2 | 3,0% | |
| 7 | Kazakhstan | 2.515,2 | 2,2% | 7 | Japan | 5.015,5 | 2,5% | 7 | Kazakhstan | 8.795,6 | 2,8% | |
| 8 | Brazil | 2.505,7 | 2,2% | 8 | Switzerland | 4.454,7 | 2,2% | 8 | South Korea | 7.364,8 | 2,3% | |
| 9 | Turkey | 2.305,0 | 2,0% | 9 | South Korea | 3.893,0 | 1,9% | 9 | Switzerland | 5.853,4 | 1,9% | |
| 10 | Switzerland | 1.398,7 | 1,2% | 10 | India | 3.396,0 | 1,7% | 10 | India | 4.483,1 | 1,4% | |
| 11 | India | 1.087,1 | 1,0% | 11 | Iran | 1.982,4 | 1,0% | 11 | Brazil | 3.201,0 | 1,0% | |
| 12 | Argentina | 823,9 | 0,7% | 12 | Egypt | 1.233,3 | 0,6% | 12 | Iran | 2.134,8 | 0,7% | |
| 13 | Malaysia | 813,9 | 0,7% | 13 | Uzbekistan | 1.212,2 | 0,6% | 13 | Uzbekistan | 1.811,9 | 0,6% | |
| 14 | Norway | 801,1 | 0,7% | 14 | Azerbaijan | 1.002,1 | 0,5% | 14 | Singapore | 1.455,3 | 0,5% | |
| 15 | Canada | 790,0 | 0,7% | 15 | Singapore | 954,7 | 0,5% | 15 | Egypt | 1.389,6 | 0,4% | |
| 16 | Thailand | 664,3 | 0,6% | 16 | Brazil | 695,3 | 0,3% | 16 | Norway | 1.344,8 | 0,4% | |
| 17 | Uzbekistan | 599,7 | 0,5% | 17 | Israel | 693,4 | 0,3% | 17 | Azerbaijan | 1.210,9 | 0,4% | |
| 18 | Ecuador | 583,6 | 0,5% | 18 | Turkmenistan | 675,4 | 0,3% | 18 | Israel | 1.151,6 | 0,4% | |
| 19 | Singapore | 500,6 | 0,4% | 19 | Kyrgyz Republic | 648,7 | 0,3% | 19 | Canada | 1.138,3 | 0,4% | |
| 20 | Vietnam | 497,8 | 0,4% | 20 | Syria | 610,6 | 0,3% | 20 | Vietnam | 1.103,1 | 0,3% | |

Source: European Trade Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/> (accessed June 7, 2011)

APPENDIX M

TURKEY 2009 TRADE PARTNERS

| TURKEY'S TRADE WITH MAIN PARTNERS (2009) | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------|----------|--------|---------------------------|---------------------|----------|--------|--------------------------|---------------------|-----------|--------|
| The Major Imports Partners | | | | The Major Export Partners | | | | The Major Trade Partners | | | |
| Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % |
| | World (all countrie | 99.753,7 | 100,0% | | World (all countrie | 72.737,1 | 100,0% | | World (all countrie | 172.490,8 | 100,0% |
| 1 | EU27 | 40.431,1 | 40,5% | 1 | EU27 | 33.589,9 | 46,2% | 1 | EU27 | 74.020,9 | 42,9% |
| 2 | Russia | 13.911,1 | 13,9% | 2 | Iraq | 3.685,9 | 5,1% | 2 | Russia | 16.203,8 | 9,4% |
| 3 | China | 9.053,8 | 9,1% | 3 | Switzerland | 2.951,4 | 4,1% | 3 | China | 10.185,0 | 5,9% |
| 4 | United States | 6.150,3 | 6,2% | 4 | United States | 2.452,6 | 3,4% | 4 | United States | 8.602,9 | 5,0% |
| 5 | Iran | 2.429,1 | 2,4% | 5 | Russia | 2.292,8 | 3,2% | 5 | Switzerland | 4.374,0 | 2,5% |
| 6 | Ukraine | 2.268,3 | 2,3% | 6 | United Arab Emirat | 2.086,5 | 2,9% | 6 | Iraq | 4.363,6 | 2,5% |
| 7 | South Korea | 2.230,5 | 2,2% | 7 | Egypt | 1.902,0 | 2,6% | 7 | Iran | 3.879,8 | 2,2% |
| 8 | Japan | 1.993,9 | 2,0% | 8 | Iran | 1.450,7 | 2,0% | 8 | Ukraine | 3.004,5 | 1,7% |
| 9 | Algeria | 1.466,9 | 1,5% | 9 | Libya | 1.287,8 | 1,8% | 9 | Algeria | 2.754,7 | 1,6% |
| 10 | Switzerland | 1.422,7 | 1,4% | 10 | Algeria | 1.287,7 | 1,8% | 10 | United Arab Emirat | 2.559,6 | 1,5% |
| 11 | India | 1.357,5 | 1,4% | 11 | Saudi Arabia | 1.269,7 | 1,7% | 11 | Saudi Arabia | 2.479,6 | 1,4% |
| 12 | Saudi Arabia | 1.209,9 | 1,2% | 12 | China | 1.131,2 | 1,6% | 12 | South Korea | 2.397,2 | 1,4% |
| 13 | Kazakhstan | 960,7 | 1,0% | 13 | Israel | 1.096,0 | 1,5% | 13 | Egypt | 2.360,7 | 1,4% |
| 14 | Brazil | 791,8 | 0,8% | 14 | Syria | 1.019,1 | 1,4% | 14 | Japan | 2.161,9 | 1,3% |
| 15 | South Africa | 786,8 | 0,8% | 15 | Azerbaijan | 1.001,2 | 1,4% | 15 | Israel | 1.872,0 | 1,1% |
| 16 | Israel | 776,1 | 0,8% | 16 | Ukraine | 736,3 | 1,0% | 16 | India | 1.652,0 | 1,0% |
| 17 | Indonesia | 728,9 | 0,7% | 17 | Turkmenistan | 673,2 | 0,9% | 17 | Libya | 1.579,4 | 0,9% |
| 18 | Malaysia | 686,3 | 0,7% | 18 | South Africa | 654,5 | 0,9% | 18 | Azerbaijan | 1.543,2 | 0,9% |
| 19 | Thailand | 684,8 | 0,7% | 19 | Georgia | 536,5 | 0,7% | 19 | South Africa | 1.441,3 | 0,8% |
| 20 | Iraq | 677,7 | 0,7% | 20 | Lebanon | 490,6 | 0,7% | 20 | Kazakhstan | 1.413,5 | 0,8% |
| 21 | Canada | 675,2 | 0,7% | 21 | Turkey | 467,0 | 0,6% | 21 | China | 1.363,0 | 0,8% |

Source: European Trade Commission, [http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-](http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/)

[opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/](http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/) (accessed June 7, 2011)

APPENDIX N

U.S. 2009 TRADE PARTNERS

| UNITED STATES' TRADE WITH MAIN PARTNERS (2009) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------------|----------------------|-------------|---------------------------|--------------------|-----------|----------------------|--------------------------|--------------|-----------|-------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-------|
| The Major Imports Partners | | | | The Major Export Partners | | | | The Major Trade Partners | | | | | | | |
| Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | | | | |
| | | World (all countrie) | 1.127.879,2 | 100,0% | | | World (all countrie) | 744.818,9 | 100,0% | | | World (all countrie) | 1.872.698,1 | 100,0% | |
| 1 | China | 221.526,2 | 19,6% | 1 | EU27 | 159.201,5 | 21,4% | 1 | EU27 | 365.512,9 | 19,5% | 1 | EU27 | 365.512,9 | 19,5% |
| 2 | EU27 | 206.311,4 | 18,3% | 2 | Canada | 146.825,3 | 19,7% | 2 | Canada | 310.586,4 | 16,6% | 2 | Canada | 310.586,4 | 16,6% |
| 3 | Canada | 163.761,1 | 14,5% | 3 | Mexico | 92.378,9 | 12,4% | 3 | China | 271.220,4 | 14,5% | 3 | China | 271.220,4 | 14,5% |
| 4 | Mexico | 127.651,1 | 11,3% | 4 | China | 49.694,3 | 6,7% | 4 | Mexico | 220.030,0 | 11,7% | 4 | Mexico | 220.030,0 | 11,7% |
| 5 | Japan | 70.401,3 | 6,2% | 5 | Japan | 36.770,9 | 4,9% | 5 | Japan | 107.172,3 | 5,7% | 5 | Japan | 107.172,3 | 5,7% |
| 6 | South Korea | 29.135,5 | 2,6% | 6 | South Korea | 20.467,8 | 2,7% | 6 | South Korea | 49.603,3 | 2,6% | 6 | South Korea | 49.603,3 | 2,6% |
| 7 | Venezuela | 20.572,6 | 1,8% | 7 | Brazil | 18.744,1 | 2,5% | 7 | Brazil | 33.821,9 | 1,8% | 7 | Brazil | 33.821,9 | 1,8% |
| 8 | Malaysia | 17.084,9 | 1,5% | 8 | Singapore | 15.956,6 | 2,1% | 8 | India | 27.629,8 | 1,5% | 8 | India | 27.629,8 | 1,5% |
| 9 | Saudi Arabia | 16.621,1 | 1,5% | 9 | Hong Kong | 15.127,3 | 2,0% | 9 | Venezuela | 27.323,2 | 1,5% | 9 | Venezuela | 27.323,2 | 1,5% |
| 10 | India | 15.836,1 | 1,4% | 10 | Australia | 14.054,5 | 1,9% | 10 | Singapore | 27.310,8 | 1,5% | 10 | Singapore | 27.310,8 | 1,5% |
| 11 | Brazil | 15.077,8 | 1,3% | 11 | Switzerland | 12.620,6 | 1,7% | 11 | Malaysia | 24.511,8 | 1,3% | 11 | Malaysia | 24.511,8 | 1,3% |
| 12 | Thailand | 14.216,0 | 1,3% | 12 | India | 11.793,7 | 1,6% | 12 | Saudi Arabia | 24.392,1 | 1,3% | 12 | Saudi Arabia | 24.392,1 | 1,3% |
| 13 | Nigeria | 13.964,3 | 1,2% | 13 | United Arab Emirat | 8.736,2 | 1,2% | 13 | Switzerland | 24.360,4 | 1,3% | 13 | Switzerland | 24.360,4 | 1,3% |
| 14 | Russia | 13.630,0 | 1,2% | 14 | Saudi Arabia | 7.771,0 | 1,0% | 14 | Israel | 20.437,4 | 1,1% | 14 | Israel | 20.437,4 | 1,1% |
| 15 | Israel | 13.569,4 | 1,2% | 15 | Malaysia | 7.426,9 | 1,0% | 15 | Australia | 20.007,7 | 1,1% | 15 | Australia | 20.007,7 | 1,1% |
| 16 | Switzerland | 11.739,8 | 1,0% | 16 | Israel | 6.868,0 | 0,9% | 16 | Thailand | 19.170,2 | 1,0% | 16 | Thailand | 19.170,2 | 1,0% |
| 17 | Singapore | 11.354,3 | 1,0% | 17 | Colombia | 6.776,8 | 0,9% | 17 | Hong Kong | 17.772,8 | 0,9% | 17 | Hong Kong | 17.772,8 | 0,9% |
| 18 | Indonesia | 9.811,3 | 0,9% | 18 | Venezuela | 6.750,6 | 0,9% | 18 | Russia | 17.484,1 | 0,9% | 18 | Russia | 17.484,1 | 0,9% |
| 19 | Vietnam | 9.347,0 | 0,8% | 19 | Chile | 6.704,7 | 0,9% | 19 | Nigeria | 16.592,4 | 0,9% | 19 | Nigeria | 16.592,4 | 0,9% |
| 20 | Colombia | 8.494,0 | 0,8% | 20 | Turkey | 5.075,1 | 0,7% | 20 | Colombia | 15.270,8 | 0,8% | 20 | Colombia | 15.270,8 | 0,8% |
| 21 | Algeria | 7.044,2 | 0,7% | 21 | Thailand | 4.064,2 | 0,7% | 21 | Indonesia | 12.467,2 | 0,7% | 21 | Indonesia | 12.467,2 | 0,7% |

Source: European Trade Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/> (accessed June 7, 2011)

APPENDIX O

EUROPE 2009 TRADE PARTNERS

| EUROPE (EXCL EU)'S TRADE WITH MAIN PARTNERS (2009) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------|-----------|--------|---------------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------|--------|--|
| The Major Imports Partners | | | | The Major Export Partners | | | | The Major Trade Partners | | | | |
| Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | Rk | Partners | Mio euro | % | |
| World (all countries) | | 458.419,1 | 100,0% | World (all countries) | | 544.716,0 | 100,0% | World (all countries) | | 1.003.135,1 | 100,0% | |
| 1 | EU27 | 247.128,3 | 53,9% | 1 | EU27 | 294.601,2 | 54,1% | 1 | EU27 | 541.729,5 | 54,0% | |
| 2 | Russia | 38.712,3 | 8,4% | 2 | United States | 25.070,0 | 4,6% | 2 | China | 56.388,0 | 5,6% | |
| 3 | China | 37.044,2 | 8,1% | 3 | China | 19.343,7 | 3,6% | 3 | Russia | 54.308,5 | 5,4% | |
| 4 | United States | 23.782,6 | 5,2% | 4 | Russia | 15.596,2 | 2,9% | 4 | United States | 48.852,6 | 4,9% | |
| 5 | Japan | 11.677,0 | 2,5% | 5 | Japan | 10.993,6 | 2,0% | 5 | Japan | 22.670,5 | 2,3% | |
| 6 | Ukraine | 10.227,9 | 2,2% | 6 | Turkey | 10.742,7 | 2,0% | 6 | Ukraine | 19.654,8 | 2,0% | |
| 7 | South Korea | 7.574,2 | 1,7% | 7 | Ukraine | 9.426,9 | 1,7% | 7 | Turkey | 15.628,8 | 1,6% | |
| 8 | Kazakhstan | 5.612,4 | 1,2% | 8 | Kazakhstan | 8.388,8 | 1,5% | 8 | South Korea | 14.976,7 | 1,5% | |
| 9 | Brazil | 5.043,6 | 1,1% | 9 | Switzerland | 8.363,8 | 1,5% | 9 | Kazakhstan | 14.001,2 | 1,4% | |
| 10 | Turkey | 4.886,2 | 1,1% | 10 | South Korea | 7.402,5 | 1,4% | 10 | Switzerland | 12.781,9 | 1,3% | |
| 11 | Switzerland | 4.418,1 | 1,0% | 11 | India | 6.729,5 | 1,2% | 11 | India | 10.528,0 | 1,0% | |
| 12 | India | 3.798,5 | 0,8% | 12 | Iran | 4.548,9 | 0,8% | 12 | Brazil | 8.072,4 | 0,8% | |
| 13 | Canada | 3.391,1 | 0,7% | 13 | Egypt | 4.495,4 | 0,8% | 13 | Canada | 7.573,8 | 0,8% | |
| 14 | Iran | 2.657,3 | 0,6% | 14 | United Arab Emirates | 4.453,5 | 0,8% | 14 | Iran | 7.206,2 | 0,7% | |
| 15 | Vietnam | 2.529,5 | 0,6% | 15 | Hong Kong | 4.437,7 | 0,8% | 15 | Hong Kong | 5.482,4 | 0,5% | |
| 16 | South Africa | 2.352,1 | 0,5% | 16 | Canada | 4.182,8 | 0,8% | 16 | United Arab Emirates | 5.352,5 | 0,5% | |
| 17 | Norway | 2.290,4 | 0,5% | 17 | Iraq | 3.998,9 | 0,7% | 17 | Egypt | 5.300,2 | 0,5% | |
| 18 | Thailand | 2.274,7 | 0,5% | 18 | Singapore | 3.517,5 | 0,6% | 18 | Singapore | 4.779,9 | 0,5% | |
| 19 | Uzbekistan | 2.167,8 | 0,5% | 19 | Saudi Arabia | 3.040,0 | 0,6% | 19 | Iraq | 4.678,5 | 0,5% | |
| 20 | Malaysia | 2.133,7 | 0,5% | 20 | Brazil | 3.028,8 | 0,6% | 20 | Israel | 4.486,9 | 0,4% | |

Source: European Trade Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/> (accessed June 7, 2011)

APPENDIX P

Top 15 trading partners for Iran, Turkey, United States, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia

| Column1 | Iran | Turkey | US | Russia | Az | Ar |
|---------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| 1 | EU | EU | EU | EU | EU | EU |
| 2 | China | Russia | Canada | China | US | Russia |
| 3 | India | China | China | Ukraine | Russia | China |
| 4 | Japan | US | Mexico | US | Israel | Ukraine |
| 5 | UAE | Iran | Brazil | Kazakhstan | Indonesia | Iran |
| 6 | SK | Ukraine | India | SK | China | Switzerland |
| 7 | Turkey | Switzerland | Japan | Japan | Turkey | US |
| 8 | South Africa | Algeria | Venezuela | Switzerland | Canada | SK |
| 9 | Russia | Iraq | SK | Turkey | Ukraine | Turkey |
| 10 | Singapore | UAE | Singapore | India | Georgia | Georgia |
| 11 | Brazil | Saudi Arabia | Malaysia | Brazil | Malaysia | Japan |
| 12 | Thailand | SK | Saudi Arabia | Iran | India | Brazil |
| 13 | Pakistan | Egypt | Switzerland | Uzbekistan | SK | Canada |
| 14 | Malaysia | Japan | Israel | Singapore | Kazakhstan | India |
| 15 | Saudi Arabia | Israel | Australia | Egypt | Croatia | UAE |

Source: European Trade Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/> (accessed June 7, 2011)

APPENDIX Q

Iran, Turkey, United States, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia manually removed from every column

| Column1 | Column2 | Column3 | Column4 | Column5 | Column6 | Column7 | Column8 |
|---------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|------------|-------------|---------|
| | Iran | Turkey | US | Russia | AZ | AR | |
| | | | | | | | |
| 1 | China | China | Canada | China | Israel | China | |
| 2 | India | Ukraine | China | Ukraine | Indonesia | Ukraine | |
| 3 | Japan | Switzerland | Mexico | Kazakhstan | China | Switzerland | |
| 4 | UAE | Algeria | Brazil | SK | Canada | SK | |
| 5 | SK | Iraq | India | Japan | Ukraine | Georgia | |
| 6 | South Africa | UAE | Japan | Switzerland | Georgia | Japan | |
| 7 | Singapore | Saudi Arabia | Venezuela | India | Malaysia | Brazil | |
| 8 | Brazil | SK | SK | Brazil | India | Canada | |
| 9 | Thailand | Egypt | Singapore | Uzbekistan | SK | India | |
| 10 | Pakistan | Japan | Malaysia | Singapore | Kazakhstan | UAE | |
| 11 | Malaysia | Israel | Saudi Arabia | Egypt | Croatia | | |
| 12 | Saudi Arabia | | Switzerland | | | | |
| 13 | | | Israel | | | | |
| 14 | | | Australia | | | | |

Source: European Trade Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/> (accessed June 7, 2011)

APPENDIX R

Top six nations that could serve as Minsk Group Co-Chairs with significant interest in regional stability

| Column1 | China | India | Japan | Brazil | Switzerland | Canada | Column2 |
|------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------|--------|---------|
| Russia | 27 | 4.4 | 10 | 3.2 | 5.8 | 1.138 | 51.538 |
| Iran | 14.84 | 8.421 | 7.355 | 0.936 | 0.579 | 0.298 | 32.429 |
| Turkey | 10.185 | 1.65 | 2.161 | 1.066 | 4.374 | 0.916 | 20.352 |
| Azerbaijan | 0.439 | 0.244 | 0.104 | 0.08 | 0.074 | 0.428 | 1.369 |
| Armenia | 0.217 | 0.033 | 0.055 | 0.039 | 0.101 | 0.037 | 0.482 |
| | | | | | | | |
| Total | 52.681 | 14.748 | 19.675 | 5.321 | 10.928 | 2.817 | 106.17 |

Source: European Trade Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/> (accessed June 7, 2011)

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